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FISCAL POLICY AND MACRO-
ECONOMIC STABILISATION IN
THE EURO AREA:P OSSIBLE
REFORMS OF THE STABILITY
AND GROWTH PACT AND
NATIONAL DECISION-MAKING
PROCESSES
The recent economic-policy debate in the EU has
largely focused on fiscal policy and the Stability
and Growth Pact. The reason is the current bud-
getary problems of some member states. Portugal
breached the three-percent-of-GDP deficit ceiling
in 2001 and 2002.Germany breached it in 2002,and
may also do so in 2003. France and Italy have
abandoned their commitments to earlier agreed
budget objectives and there is a clear threat that
they may violate the deficit ceiling, too. These
events have contributed to a revival of the debate
on the fiscal policy framework in the EU. The
European Commission has recently proposed a
number of changes in the Stability and Growth
Pact (European Commission, 2002b). There have
also been calls for more fundamental revisions of
the EU fiscal policy framework including propos-
als to scrap the Stability and Growth Pact al-
together (see, for example, Financial Times,
2002a,b,c; Economist, 2002; de Grauwe, 2002; or
Walton, 2002).
A key issue is the need to combine long-run sus-
tainability of fiscal policy with short-run flexibility
as a tool for macroeconomic stabilisation.The cur-
rent EU fiscal rules mainly reflect a desire to
enhance long-run fiscal discipline.This is explained
by the earlier rapid accumulation of government
debt, but also by the view that discretionary fiscal
policy is unsuitable as an instrument of counter-
cyclical stabilisation. At the same time, the risk of
asymmetric cyclical developments in individual
euro countries creates a potential need for using
national fiscal policy as a stabilisation tool.This has
led to a criticism that the EU fiscal rules are too
rigid and hamper the use of fiscal policy for stabil-
isation purposes in an inappropriate way.The rules
have also been criticised for being arbitrary.At the
same time, the current discussion illustrates very
clearly that it may be very difficult to apply the
rules in a sufficiently disciplining way when they
are put to a real test.
One aim of this chapter is to analyse what role fis-
cal policy should play as a stabilisation tool in the
euro area. In line with other recent contributions,
we argue that this role should be larger than
according to the conventional wisdom that has pre-
vailed in recent years. We also argue that this
requires changes in the fiscal policy framework at
the EU level. Recent proposals of the European
Commission seek to make the EU fiscal rules more
flexible through changes in the interpretation of
the Stability and Growth Pact and a greater
reliance on discretionary judgements. We argue
that this approach is potentially harmful and that
more fundamental reforms, implying changes in
the Maastricht Treaty, are required.There is a case
for letting the deficit ceiling in the Treaty depend
on the debt level in a transparent way. Countries
with low debt should be allowed to run larger bud-
get deficits than three percent of GDP.This would
serve both to give low-debt countries greater scope
for stabilisation policy and to enhance the incen-
tives for fiscal discipline.Another recommendation
is that the decisions on sanctions against EMU
member states that violate the deficit ceiling
should be moved from the political level of the
Ecofin Council1 to the judicial level of the
European Court of Justice. This would make the
enforcement of the fiscal rules more credible.
Changes in the EU fiscal rules involve difficult
trade-offs. On the one hand, if the rules are per-
ceived as too rigid and arbitrary by the public,their
legitimacy will gradually evaporate and they will
become unsustainable. On the other hand, the
credibility of the fiscal policy framework must not
be undermined by an impression that the rules are
changed in a discretionary way as soon as they
begin to bite, especially for the large EU countries.
There is a continued need for fiscal rules at the EU
level to enhance the incentives for fiscal discipline.
The future burdens of ageing populations make
large reductions of government debt highly desir-
able.Therefore, the medium-term budget objective
of “close to balance or in surplus” should be main-
tained,although it should be made explicit that it is
set in cyclically adjusted terms.
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Current events have, however, illustrated that
there are limits to how much fiscal rules at the EU
level can achieve on their own. Governments are
likely always to shun away from political conflicts
about each others’ fiscal policies. This is an argu-
ment for relying to a much larger extent than hith-
erto on national institutions that are conducive to
both long-run fiscal discipline and effective short-
run stabilisation policy. This can be seen as an
application of the general principle of subsidiarity
(see Chapter 3). One step in this direction would
be to require the member states to adopt laws on
fiscal policy that set well-defined long-run sustain-
ability goals which are consistent with the common
EU objectives, but also outline clear principles for
the use of fiscal policy as a stabilisation tool.
Although it is clearly not on the political agenda
now, one should also explore the future possibilities
of reforming the national decision processes for fis-
cal policy along the lines of monetary policy, as has
recently been suggested in a number of contribu-
tions. Notwithstanding that the idea may seem unfa-
miliar to many, there is a case for trying to separate
fiscal policy decisions with the aim of stabilising the
economy from other types of fiscal policy decisions.
One possibility might be delegation to an indepen-
dent national fiscal policy authority. Such delegation
would be in line with developments in other areas
such as competition policy as well as financial regu-
lation and supervision, where in many countries the
operational conduct of policy has been delegated to
various bodies,and politicians have focused more on
setting the overall objectives. Delegation of national
fiscal policy decisions could also be seen as an alter-
native to the larger role in fiscal policy surveillance
desired by the European Commission (European
Commission, 2002b).
The underlying motive for del-
egation at the national level is a
desire to mitigate the problems
hampering the use of fiscal pol-
icy as a stabilisation instru-
ment: long decision lags, irre-
versibility of decisions, risks of
contributing to a deficit bias,
“confounding” of various
objectives and so on. However,
it remains an open question
whether one could find forms
of fiscal policy delegation that
would be accepted by the gen-
eral public. The most realistic
possibility in the near future might be to require
the government to consult with an independent fis-
cal policy committee before making its budget
decisions and to base these on the committee’s
estimates of the cyclical situation and its forecasts
of government revenues and expenditures.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 1
reviews the role of fiscal policy as a tool of stabili-
sation policy both in general and in the specific
EMU context. Section 2 analyses the case for mod-
ifications of the current fiscal policy framework in
the EU. Section 3 discusses the possibilities to
strengthen the fiscal policy framework at the
national level and the case for letting an indepen-
dent fiscal authority play a larger role.
1. Fiscal policy as a stabilisation tool
The perception of the role of fiscal policy has
changed radically over recent decades. Discretion-
ary fiscal policy to stabilise the economy has come
to be regarded with great scepticism. Instead, the
conventional wisdom today is that monetary policy
should be the main stabilisation tool.
One explanation of this development is, of course,
the large accumulation of government debt in most
OECD countries in the 1980s and early 1990s,
which is unprecedented in peacetime (see Fig-
ure 2.1).As a consequence, fiscal sustainability has
become the main fiscal policy issue, and major
reforms of the fiscal policy framework have been
undertaken in nearly all OECD countries. These
reforms include both various fiscal policy rules,
like the ones in the Maastricht Treaty and the
Figure 2.1Stabilisation and Growth Pact, and procedural
changes in the national budget processes in various
countries (see, for example, Kopits and Symansky,
1997; and von Hagen et al., 2002). In terms of aca-
demic research, the problems with accumulating
government debt have stimulated a large body of
literature explaining why unconstrained fiscal pol-
icy may involve a permanent deficit bias (see
Alesina and Perotti, 1995, for a survey).
Two major types of theoretical objections have
been raised against using fiscal policy for stabilisa-
tion purposes.The first one questions the technical
effectiveness of such policies.The second objection
questions the ability of policy makers to use fiscal
stabilisation policy in an effective way.
The discussion of the technical effectiveness of fis-
cal policy takes its starting point in the notion of
so-called Ricardian equivalence (see Elmendorf
and Mankiw, 1999, for a survey). The argument is
that tax reductions or transfer increases that raise
the disposable incomes of households will fail to
increase private consumption if they involve larger
budget deficits: households will realise that their
life-cycle incomes have not increased, as they will
have to pay for the deficits through higher taxes or
lower transfers in the future. Another argument
holds that tax reductions or government expendi-
ture increases could even give rise to perverse neg-
ative demand effects if they are associated with
credibility problems that lead to increased interest
rates or to expectations of future “crisis adjust-
ments” that will lower life-cycle incomes (see, for
example, Giavazzi and Pagano, 1996; and Giavazzi
et al., 2000).
There are a number of arguments why discre-
tionary fiscal policy may be used in a less effective
way as a stabilisation tool than monetary policy.
• Decision lags are longer, as tax and expenditure
changes have to go through a lengthy parlia-
mentary decision-making process, which is usu-
ally annual in contrast to the almost continuous
decision-making process for monetary policy.
• The political character of fiscal policy decisions
makes it much harder to reverse decisions when
circumstances change than is the case for mone-
tary policy (Taylor, 2000).
• Fiscal policy has other central goals than stabil-
isation, viz. income distribution and resource
allocation. In addition, fiscal policy measures
are often influenced by attempts of incumbent
governments to enhance their reelection
chances. Hence there is the serious risk that the
stabilisation aspects will carry a low weight.
• The risk of an expansionary bias is much larger
for fiscal policy than for monetary policy, as the
former is run by policy-makers engaged in day-
to-day politics, whereas the latter has been del-
egated to independent central banks, which can
take a more long-run view.
The conclusion has been that fiscal stabilisation pol-
icy is likely to be badly timed and procyclical, espe-
cially in booms because it is politically much more
difficult then to pursue restrictive policies than it is
to pursue expansionary policies in recessions.2
The current conventional wisdom is that fiscal pol-
icy should mainly be confined to letting the auto-
matic stabilisers work, that is to let the automatic
variations in the budget balance that follow from
the cyclical variations in tax receipts and some gov-
ernment expenditures, such as unemployment ben-
efits and costs for labour market programmes,
dampen the business cycle (see, for example,
Taylor, 2000; Buti and Martinot, 2000; Buti and
Giudice, 2002; or European Commission, 2002a).
Because of their “automatic” character, such poli-
cies do not raise the same problems of decision
lags, deficit bias and problems of reversing policies
in new situations as have traditionally been associ-
ated with discretionary fiscal policy.The size of the
automatic stabilisers are positively related to the
share of government expenditure in GDP, the
degree of tax progressivity and the generosity of
unemployment compensation. Recent empirical
research does indeed confirm that large govern-
ment sectors, and thus large automatic stabilisers,
reduce output volatility to a significant degree
(Gali, 1994; Fatàs and Mihov, 2001, 2002).3
1.1 The case for discretionary fiscal policy
Adopting a more long-term perspective, it has
been noted that there have been large swings over
time in the relative emphasis given to fiscal and
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to, for example, Leibfritz et al. (1994), Buti et al. (1997), and
European Commission (2001). But these empirical conclusions
have to some extent been challenged by Mélitz (2002) and Wyplosz
(2002).
3 According to Fatàs and Mihov (2002), an increase in the ratio of
government expenditure from 40 to 50 per cent of GDP reduces
the standard deviation of real GDP growth among the OECD
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monetary policy as stabilisation tools (Wyplosz,
2002a). This raises the possibility that the present
downplaying of fiscal policy as a stabilisation
instrument may have gone too far. Indeed, this has
recently been suggested in a number of contribu-
tions,such as Ball (1997),Wren-Lewis (2000,2002),
von Hagen (2001), Seidmann (2001), Blanchard
and Perotti (2002), Fàtas and Mihov (2002), and
Wyplosz (2002a), who all have argued for a revival
of the role of fiscal policy.
There are several reasons why relying on discre-
tionary monetary policy may not be enough in
many situations.
A well-known argument is that monetary policy
may be impotent in a depression when it can be
caught in a liquidity trap, because it is impossible
to achieve negative real interest rates in situations
with falling prices.Japan is an obvious case in point
(see the Box on Japan in Chapter 1 in this report).
But also in more normal situations, there may be
limitations to monetary policy because central
banks are reluctant to change interest rates by
much in the short run, as this would imply large
variations in the prices of outstanding debt (inter-
est rate smoothing).
It has also been claimed that fiscal policy can more
easily be targeted in a desirable way than monetary
policy. Ball (1997) and Wren-Lewis (2000, 2002)
argue that fiscal policy can be designed so as to
have more even effects across the economy than
monetary policy, which will have a greater impact
on construction and investment goods sectors than
on service sectors.These more even effects may be
desirable in some situations. In other situations,
one may want to target measures more specifically,
for example to counteract a real property price
boom, which may be easier through targeted fiscal
policy (such as reductions of tax relief for mort-
gage interest rates) than through monetary policy.
The strongest argument in favour of fiscal policy in
the euro area is the risk of asymmetric cyclical devel-
opments in individual countries. In the event of such
macroeconomic disturbances,national fiscal policy is
the only remaining stabilisation policy tool.There is
an obvious case for such stabilisation policy in reces-
sions, as money wages, and thus also prices, tend to
be rigid downwards (Calmfors, 1998; Calmfors et al.,
2001). The case for stabilisation policy in booms is
somewhat more complex. A relative price increase
vis-à-vis other countries (a real exchange rate appre-
ciation) may be a proper adjustment to macroeco-
nomic shocks that raise output growth. Whether or
not this is the case depends, as was discussed in last
year’s EEAG report (EEAG,2002),on the character
of the shocks. In the case of permanent structural
changes,such as a permanent increase in the relative
demand for a country’s output or a permanent
increase in the relative productivity of a country,
prices could just be left “to do their job”. But this is
not an appropriate response in the case of a tempo-
rary asymmetric demand increase. The main reason
is again downward money wage rigidity: inflation in
a temporary boom tends to cause “permanent”wage
increases that are hard to reverse and therefore
“lock in” real exchange rate appreciations. This
makes it more difficult to stabilise the economy in
the next recession,as the real exchange rate appreci-
ation requires a more expansionary fiscal policy with
larger budget deficits than would otherwise be the
case (Swedish Government Commission on
Stabilisation Policy in the EMU, 2002). The main
rationale for fiscal stabilisation policy in a boom is
thus intertemporal considerations relating to future
stabilisation possibilities.4
A related intertemporal argument for fiscal stabil-
isation policy in booms in the EMU countries is the
risk of strong asset price reversals, that is boom-
bust cycles in asset prices where first large asset
price rises reinforce the upswing and then large
asset price falls exacerbate the downswing. Again,
the most obvious recent example is Japan. The
macroeconomic consequences of such excessive
asset price volatility has recently been studied by
Bordo and Jeanne (2002), who find boom-bust
cycles to be much more common in real property
prices than in stock prices and to be associated
with large cyclical swings in output. This finding is
highly relevant for stabilisation policy in the EMU
countries, because cycles are much more likely to
be country-specific in real property prices than in
stock prices. Interestingly, Bordo and Jeanne
(2002) also find boom-bust cycles in real property
prices to be more common in small than in large
countries, which they explain by the larger relative
importance of local markets in small countries (the
4 Some of the discussion on to what extent “prices should be left to
do their job” has focused on whether demand shocks are internal
or external. It has been argued that price adjustments are appro-
priate only in the latter case (Blanchard, 2001; European
Commission,2002a).In our view,these are not the relevant consid-
erations, because a temporary increase in external demand is as
problematic as a temporary increase in internal demand if it leads
to a real exchange rate appreciation that is hard to reverse.relative size of the Stockholm area in Sweden is
larger than that of the Berlin area in Germany).
Why are automatic stabilisers not likely to be a suf-
ficient fiscal policy tool in the case of large cyclical
asymmetries in the euro area? There are a number
of reasons.
• By their very nature automatic stabilisers can
only cushion macroeconomic shocks, but not
fully offset them. According to most estimates,
automatic stabilisers reduce output fluctuations
by around a third in the EU countries (see, for
example, van den Noord, 2000; and European
Commission, 2002a).
• As discussed above, the size of the automatic sta-
bilisers is positively related to the share of gov-
ernment expenditure in GDP, the degree of tax
progressivity and the generosity of unemploy-
ment compensation. But the decisions on such
structural parameters have not been influenced
much by stabilisation concerns:instead the size of
automatic stabilisers is a by-product of other con-
siderations, such as preferences over private ver-
sus public consumption or over income distribu-
tion versus allocative efficiency. There is no rea-
son, therefore, to believe that the automatic sta-
bilisers give an optimal degree of stabilisation.
Nor should one expect that differences in the size
of the automatic stabilisers among countries, for
example due to differences in the share of gov-
ernment expenditures in GDP, as shown in Table
2.1, reflect differences in the preferences for sta-
bilisation.Countries with small automatic stabilis-
ers may therefore want to use discretionary fiscal
policy more than others.
• Structural reforms in the European economies
with the aim of raising long-run employment and
growth has weakened the automatic stabilisers.
This is evident from Table 2.1, which shows the
reduction in the size of government in recent
years (from an unweighted average in the EU of
45.0 percent of GDP in 1994 to 41.7 percent in
2002). In addition, tax progressivity and the gen-
erosity of unemployment benefits (mainly in
terms of coverage but also to some extent in
terms of benefit levels and duration) have – for
good reasons – been reduced (see EEAG,2002;as
well as the Box on Germany in Chapter 1 in this
report).
• Finally, if there are permanent supply shocks,
the automatic stabilisers tend to prolong the
adjustment process and cause budget effects
that must ultimately be eliminated through dis-
cretionary action.
1.2 How effective is fiscal policy as a demand 
management tool?
The discussion on Ricardian equivalence has con-
tributed to the impression that fiscal policies are
not very effective (see Elmendorf and Mankiw,
1999). Much of this discussion is, however, rather
superficial as it tends to lump together various fis-
cal policies that should theoretically be expected to
have very different effects.
The ineffectiveness postulate of Ricardian equiva-
lence applies only to tax and transfer changes that
affect the real disposable income of households.
The postulate holds only under very restrictive
assumptions: households must have a long enough
time horizon for taking into account offsetting
future tax and transfer changes and they must not
be credit-constrained. One would expect the for-
mer assumption to be more valid in situations of
pressing government debt problems when the pub-
lic debate focuses on sustainability issues (as in the
1990s) than in more normal times (like now). One




Government spending, excluding interest payments,
as a percentage of GDP in the EU countries
1994 1998 2001 2002
Austria 49.2 47.0 47.7 48.2
Belgium 41.5 40.7 40.3 40.4
Germany 43.1 42.7 42.7 43.0
Denmark 54.7 51.5 48.9 49.5
Spain na 35.2 34.6 34.8
Finland 56.4 46.4 43.6 44.2
France 48.5 46.7 45.9 46.6
Greece 32.1 34.9 36.6 37.2
Ireland 36.6 29.9 29.9 31.4
Italy 41.7 39.8 40.5 40.8
Luxembourg 43.7 40.9 39.5 43.3
Netherlands 43.2 39.2 39.3 40.3
Portugal 36.6 36.7 38.9 38.4
Sweden 62.9 52.7 50.1 50.9
United Kingdom 40.0 34.6 36.3 37.0
Unweighted average 45.0 41.3 41.0 41.7
Standard deviation 8.2 6.4 5.4 5.4
Coefficient of variation 0.18 0.15 0.13 0.13
Note: The budget balance can be written B = tY - G, where
B is the budget surpuls, t is the tax rate, Y is real GDP and
G is real government expenditure. Dividing by Y, we have
b = B/Y = t - G/Y, where b is the budget balance as a ratio
of GDP. Differentiation with respect to b and Y gives
db = (G/Y) dY/Y. So, G/Y is the semi-elasticity of the
budget surplus as a percentage of GDP with respect to real
output, that is it indicates by how many percentage points
of GDP the fiscal balance improves when output rises by
one percent.
Source: OECD Economic Outlook 72 (December 2002).EEAG Report 51
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changes to be effective that are targeted on low-
income groups, which to a large extent are credit-
constrained (Wren-Lewis, 2000, 2002). Such target-
ing may also be motivated from a welfare point of
view, as these groups are more exposed to cyclical
income volatility than groups with higher incomes
(Storesletten et al., 2001).
Most empirical evidence seems to support substan-
tial demand effects of tax changes. The evidence
that automatic stabilisers, which work mainly on
the tax side, reduce the volatility of output and
consumption, is not consistent with Ricardian
equivalence (Gali, 1994; Fàtas and Mihov, 2001,
2002).Blanchard and Perotti (1998) recently found
a multiplier of close to one for discretionary tax
changes in the U.S., whereas other studies have
found somewhat lower multipliers (Wren-Lewis,
2000, 2002; Wijkander and Roeger, 2002; Swedish
Government Commission on Stabilisation Policy in
the EMU, 2002; European Commission, 2002a).
Temporary changes in government consumption also
have an effect on aggregate demand under
Ricardian equivalence.This is obvious if an increase
in current government consumption is financed
through a reduction in future government consump-
tion, as this involves no change in the taxes paid by
households and hence no change in private con-
sumption. But a similar conclusion holds also if a
temporary increase in government consumption is
financed through future taxes. The explanation is
that the short-run direct demand effects are larger
than the short-run effects on private consumption
due to future tax changes: this is so because the
changes in private consumption resulting from the
changes in life-time incomes will be spread over the
whole future, as households want to smooth con-
sumption over time, whereas the entire change in
government consumption occurs in the short run.
The positive output effects of increases in govern-
ment consumption have been confirmed in a number
of recent empirical studies (for example, Rotemberg
and Woodford, 1992; Ramey and Shapiro, 1997;
Edelberg et al., 1998; Fàtas and Mihov, 1999; and
Blanchard and Perotti, 1999). In most cases multipli-
ers around one are found. Some of the studies find
that increases in government consumption are asso-
ciated with increases in private consumption – and
not decreases as implied by Ricardian equivalence
(Blanchard and Perotti, 1999; Fàtas and Mihov,
1999). Other work has found that the fiscal multipli-
ers for government consumption are larger than for
income taxes (Wren-Lewis, 2000, 2002; Wijkander
and Roeger, 2001; European Commission, 2002a).
In the economic-policy discussion there is a tenden-
cy to associate fiscal policy mainly with measures
that affect aggregate demand either via direct expen-
diture changes or via tax and transfer changes that
have an impact on the disposable income of house-
holds. But fiscal policy can also work by changing
relative prices. One such policy, which has been used
at times in Sweden, is temporary changes in VAT
(see also Blinder,2001;Wijkander and Roeger,2002;
European Commission,2002a;Swedish Government
Commission on Stabilisation Policy in the EMU,
2002;and Wren-Lewis,2002).A temporary change in
VAT affects private consumption in a similar way as
a change in the real interest rate:by changing the rel-
ative price between consumption in different time
periods, households are induced to reallocate con-
sumption spending intertemporally. One could also
conceive of a similar use of investment taxes or sub-
sidies to affect the timing of private investment
(Swedish Government Commission on Stabilisation
Policy in the EMU,2002;Wren-Lewis,2002).There is
some evidence that the fiscal multipliers are consid-
erably larger for VAT than for income taxes (Wren-
Lewis, 2000, 2002; Wijkander and Roeger, 2002;
European Commission, 2002a).
Cross-border trade usually limits the possibilities
to set VAT rates according to national priorities.
But this does not apply in the same way to tempo-
rary VAT changes as a stabilisation tool in the case
of asymmetric cyclical developments. On the con-
trary,if a temporary rise in national VAT in a boom
shifts consumption purchases abroad, this, too,
tends to reduce demand domestically. A potential
risk of using temporary VAT increases to dampen
an asymmetric boom in a euro country is, however,
that they could trigger “permanent” wage increas-
es, although the risk is much smaller than in the
case of permanent VAT changes.
Another possibility, which has also been over-
looked in much of the international discussion, is
to use temporary variations in the payroll taxes
levied on employers as a discretionary stabilisation
tool. By changing wage costs, such a policy directly
affects the real labour cost and the real exchange
rate. It thus represents a way of letting prices do
their job in the case of asymmetric cyclical devel-
opments. However, since real exchange rate
changes are known to affect trade volumes withsubstantial lags, such a policy would seem relevant
mainly in the case of relatively drawn-out distur-
bances. It is not only temporary reductions in pay-
roll taxes in downswings that may be of interest. In
fact, temporary rises in employers’ payroll taxes
may be a very appropriate policy if an individual
euro country experiences an asymmetric boom.
The reason is that higher payroll taxes for employ-
ers raise domestic wage costs and output prices,but
not domestic wages. On the contrary, wages are
likely to fall to the extent that the demand for
domestic output falls and the tax is shifted back-
wards on to employees because the “room for
wage increases” is reduced.5
The upshot is that a temporary increase in employers’
payroll taxes may be a desirable way of dampening a
boom,because wage costs are temporarily raised at the
same time as the risk is reduced that wages are bid up
more permanently.The idea of using cyclical variations
in employers’ payroll taxes in this way has large simi-
larities with the system of so-called buffer funds that
was set up in Finland in connection with the entry into
the EMU. According to this system, funds have been
built up through a temporary increase in various
employer contributions to the social security system
with the intention to use the proceeds of these funds to
hold down contributions in downswings (Calmfors,
1998; Holm et al., 1999; Swedish Government Com-
mission on Stabilisation Policy in the EMU, 2002).6
Our conclusion is that discre-
tionary fiscal stabilisation policy
is potentially effective and that
occasions are likely to arise in the
euro countries when its use
would be desirable. We are not
thinking about “fine tuning”, but
about countercyclical stabilisa-
tion in the event of major macro-
economic disturbances.This does,
however, require a fiscal policy framework that pre-
vents misuse of stabilisation measures that causes
excessive debt accumulation. It also requires address-
ing the problems of long decision lags and irreversibil-
ity of fiscal policy measures. The problem of decision
lags is perhaps most obvious in the case of temporary
VAT changes: it is a serious problem if, for example, a
temporary increase in VAT in a boom can be decided
only in a lengthy political process, as the anticipation
of the measure will lead to effects that are the reverse
of those desired in the period before the measure
came into force.The problem of irreversibility is most
clear-cut for increases in government consumption in
a recession. As we have argued, this is likely to be a
more effective stabilisation tool than general cuts in
personal income taxes, but there is a serious risk of
political  “ratchet effects” making it impossible to
reduce government consumption again in the next
boom (Wijkander and Roeger, 2002). We shall return
to these issues in Section 3,after first having discussed
the fiscal rules at the EU level and their impact on the
possibilities to pursue stabilisation policies.
2. Possible reforms of EU fiscal rules
The “raison d’être” for the fiscal rules in the EU is
the desire to ensure long-run sustainability of pub-
lic finances, which came under threat in the 1980s
and early 1990s because of the rapid build-up of
government debt in most member countries.This is




Gross government debt as a percentage of GDP in the EU countries,
1980 – 2003
1980 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003
Belgium 78.6 129.2 133.9 109.2 107.6 105.6 101.7
Denmark 36.5 57.8 69.3 46.8 44.7 44.0 42.4
Germany 31.7 43.5 57.0 60.2 59.5 60.9 61.8
Greece 25.0 79.6 108.7 106.2 107.0 105.8 102.0
Spain 16.8 43.6 63.9 60.5 57.1 55.0 53.2
France 19.8 35.1 54.6 57.3 57.3 58.6 59.3
Ireland 75.2 101.5 82.6 39.1 36.4 35.3 35.0
Italy 58.2 97.2 123.2 110.6 109.9 110.3 108.0
Luxembourg 9.3 4.4 5.6 5.6 5.6 4.6 3.9
Netherlands 46.0 77.0 77.2 55.8 52.8 51.0 50.1
Austria 36.2 57.2 69.2 63.6 63.2 63.2 63.0
Portugal 32.3 58.3 64.3 53.3 55.5 57.4 58.1
Finland 11.5 14.3 57.2 44.0 43.4 42.4 41.9
Sweden 40.3 42.3 76.2 55.3 56.6 53.8 51.7
United Kingdom 53.2 34.0 51.8 42.1 39.1 38.5 38.1
Unweighted average 38.0 58.3 73.0 60.6 59.7 59.1 58.0
GDP-weighted average 38.0 54.4 70.2 64.1 63.0 63.0 62.5
Standard deviation 20.5 32.5 30.2 27.5 27.7 27.8 26.9
Coefficient of variation 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Note: The 1980 and 1990 figures for Germany refer to west Germany.
Source: European Commission (2002c).
5 This latter tax-shifting effect has been
shown to be empirically strong in the
Nordic countries (see Calmfors and
Nymoen, 1991; Rødseth and Nymoen,
1999; and Calmfors and Uddén
Sonnegård, 2001). The effects mentioned
in the text could be counteracted,because
compensating wage claims are triggered
by the CPI rises associated with higher
output prices when payroll taxes are
increased, but this effect is likely to be
small compared to the other effects.
6 As unemployment benefits were earlier
financed on a purely “pay-as-you-go”
basis in Finland, variations in employer
contribution rates had a procyclical
impact on the economy with rates going
up in recessions and down in booms.EEAG Report 53
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There are two main motives for fiscal rules at the
EU level. The first – and in our view the most
important – motive is to enhance fiscal discipline in
general.The need for this has been emphasised by
an extensive political-economy literature, which
has pointed out how a large number of factors may
cause a deficit bias (see, for example, Alesina and
Perotti, 1995; or von Hagen et al., 2002).These fac-
tors include: (i) fiscal illusion on part of the gener-
al public;(ii) the fact that it is politically more pop-
ular to stimulate demand in recessions than to
restrain it in booms; (iii) the use of debt by incum-
bent governments as a strategic variable to favour
their own constituencies and constrain the policies
of future governments in favour of other con-
stituencies; (iv) distributional conflicts; (v) lobby-
ing by local constituencies for targeted benefits,
the costs of which are shared nationally; and (vi)
problems of time inconsistency, according to which
governments cannot resist ex post the temptation
to abandon sound fiscal policy even if it is clear ex
ante that this is inappropriate.
The desire to strengthen budgetary discipline in
general is not related to EMU per se. Rather, in a
situation of general fiscal profligacy, monetary uni-
fication offered a unique opportunity to establish
constraints on government budget deficits and
debt accumulation at the EU level.As the creation
of EMU required the set-up of new institutions
anyway, it appeared much easier to establish such
rules at the EU level than to initiate national
reform processes, which could more easily be
blocked by various vested interests. In this per-
spective, the role of an “external enforcer” of bud-
getary discipline that the EU has assumed can be
seen as an outcome of very specific historic cir-
cumstances.
The second motive for fiscal rules at the EU level
is the moral-hazard problems that can arise in a
monetary union because fiscal policies in one
member state have spillover effects on the other
states. A number of such spillover effects have
been identified (see, for example, Buiter et al.,
1993; or Beetsma, 2001). There is a potential risk
that other governments could in the end feel
forced to bail out a bankrupt government of an
individual member country.There is a risk for pres-
sures on the ECB of both direct (buying up the
debt of a highly indebted country in the secondary
market) and indirect bail-outs (setting lower inter-
est rates than are motivated by price stability con-
siderations). Finally, the recent “fiscal theory of
price determination” emphasises the risk that the
ECB will be unable to control inflation if fiscal
policies are not sustainable (Canzoneri and Diba,
2001). The argument starts from the observation
that solvency of the government requires the dis-
counted value of future primary surpluses (includ-
ing seigniorage revenue of the central bank) to
match the outstanding real value of government
debt. If fiscal policy violates this constraint, and
monetary authorities do not relax their policy
stance, solvency can only be maintained by an
upward jump of the price level, which lowers the
price of nominal government debt in terms of
goods and thus reduces the real value of the debt.
2.1.The present framework
The fiscal rules in the EU are determined mainly
by the provisions in the Maastricht Treaty on the
excessive deficit procedure (Article 104.3) and by
the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which is
embodied in two regulations of the Ecofin Council
and two resolutions of the European Council (see,
for example, Buti et al., 2001).7 The Treaty sets out
the basic stipulations, whereas the SGP defines
their operational content. The main rules are as
follows:
• The Treaty sets a deficit ceiling (a reference
value) of three percent of GDP for the actual
government budget balance. Larger deficits are
considered “excessive” unless “the excess over
the reference value is only exceptional and tem-
porary and the ratio remains close to the refer-
ence value”. The formal wording of this escape
clause must be regarded as quite stringent,as all
the conditions in it must in principle be fulfilled
for it to apply (Balassone and Franco,2001;Buti
and Giudice, 2002). According to the SGP, the
exceptionality condition can refer either to “an
unusual event outside the control of the
Member State in question which has a major
impact on the financial position of the general
government” or to an “abrupt cyclical down-
turn”. The formal decision on whether or not a
deficit should be considered “excessive”is taken
by the Ecofin Council,acting on a recommenda-
tion from the Commission. An annual fall of
real GDP of more than 2 percent should auto-
7 The European Council consists of the heads of state or govern-
ment of the EU countries.matically be considered as “abrupt” and a fall of
between 0.75 and 2 percent could be considered
to be so after a discretionary judgement by the
Council. The Council could also take into
account the cumulative loss of output relative to
past trends when deciding whether a member
state has an “excessive deficit”. If a member
state does not take corrective action to elimi-
nate an “excessive deficit”, as recommended by
the Council, it will be required to pay an annual
interest-free deposit of 0.2–0.5 percent of GDP.
If the “excessive deficit” persists, this deposit
will be converted into a fine,which is distributed
among the other member states.
• The Treaty also stipulates that gross government
debt should not exceed 60 percent of GDP. If it
does, the debt ratio should be decreasing “at a
satisfactory pace”. The wording must be inter-
preted to mean that government debt is not
allowed to increase when it is above the 60 per-
cent ceiling.Formally,no escape clause is associ-
ated with this stipulation, but there are no mon-
etary sanctions in the case of violations.
• According to the SGP, countries should aim for a
“medium-term” budgetary position of “close to
balance or in surplus”. To ensure compatibility
with this objective, there is a process of multilat-
eral budgetary surveillance. EMU member states
have to submit standardised stability programmes
and non-EMU member states similar conver-
gence programmes specifying budget targets.
These programmes form the basis for the regular
monitoring of the fiscal performance of individual
countries by the Council, acting on recommenda-
tions of the Commission. In the case of a “signifi-
cant divergence”of budgetary outcomes from tar-
gets, the Council can issue an early warning to a
member state. According to the stated principles
of the Commission,it takes both cyclical develop-
ments and the risk of breaching the three-percent
deficit ceiling into account when judging whether
or not there is a “significant divergence” (Euro-
pean Commission,2002a).A downward deviation
from the budget target due to the response of
automatic stabilisers to unanticipated cyclical
developments is not considered such a divergence
for a country meeting the medium-term objective
of “close to balance or in surplus”, whereas it is
for a country that does not fulfil this criterion and
approaches the deficit ceiling.
One ambiguity in the SGP has concerned the
“close to balance or in surplus” budget objective.
A common interpretation has been that this is a
target for the cyclically adjusted budget balance
(Balassone and Franco, 2001; Buti and Giudice,
2002; European Commission, 2002a). On this
interpretation, it has been argued that the medi-
um-term budget target should be set such as to
provide a safety margin for both cyclical develop-
ments and unanticipated budgetary risks. High-
debt countries should, in addition, take into
account the objective of reducing their govern-
ment debt levels when setting their budget targets
(European Commission, 2002a). But, as noted in
last year’s EEAG report (EEAG, 2002), the SGP
does not state explicitly that the medium-term
objective refers to the cyclically adjusted balance,
and the budget targets in the stability and conver-
gence programmes have been stated in actual
rather than in cyclically adjusted terms. Recently,
however,the Commission proposed that the medi-
um-term budget objective should refer explicitly
to the cyclically adjusted balance (European
Commission, 2002b).
An important feature of the fiscal rules is that they
attach greater importance to the current govern-
ment budget balance (the net flow of receipts and
expenditures) than to the stock of government
debt.The monetary sanctions are related to viola-
tions of the deficit ceiling only but not of the debt
criterion. The medium-term objective of “close to
balance or in surplus” also refers to the current
budget balance. However, as the long-run debt is
determined by the cumulated sum of deficits over
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time, the budget balance objective implicitly
defines a goal for long-run debt. If the “close to
balance or in surplus” target is interpreted as a
balanced cyclically adjusted budget, the implicit
long-run target for government net debt is zero.8
In addition to this, recent Council Resolutions
have suggested that the future strains on public
finances from ageing populations may require
even more ambitious targets (European Com-
mission, 2002a).
Although discretionary fiscal policy in the event of
major cyclical disturbances are not explicitly ruled out
by the Stability and Growth Pact,the consensus seems
to be that the medium-term target (the target for the
cyclically adjusted balance) should provide room pri-
marily for the automatic stabilisers to work (Buti and
Giudice, 2002; European Commission, 2002a).
Box 2.1
The cyclically adjusted budget balance
Tax receipts in general and some government expendi-
tures, such as unemployment benefits, vary automati-
cally with the output and employment levels. To assess
the underlying (structural) budgetary situation, one
must therefore adjust the actual budget balance for the
cyclical conditions. Computations of the cyclically ad-
justed budget balance require estimates of both the
output gap, that is the extent to which actual output de-
viates from the equilibrium (potential) level, and of the
sensitivity of the budget balance to such deviations.
Technically, the cyclically adjusted budget balance as a
ratio of GDP, bc, is calculated as:
bc = b – α  g,
where b is the actual budget balance as a ratio of GDP,
g is the deviation of actual from equilibrium GDP as a
ratio of equilibrium GDP, and α  is the effect on the
actual budget balance of a one percentage point in-
crease in the output gap. The lines in Figure 2.2 show
how the actual budget balance depends on the output
gap and the cyclically adjusted budget balance. The
cyclically adjusted balances are given by the inter-
sections of the lines with the vertical axis. In booms,
when the output gap is positive, the actual budget
balance is more positive (less negative) than the cycli-
cally adjusted balance. In recessions, when the output
gap is negative, the actual budget balance is less positi-
ve (more negative) than the cyclically adjusted one.
Provided that cyclical deviations are symmetrically
distributed around equilibrium output, a given annual
cyclically adjusted budget balance implies the same
given average annual actual budget balance.
The largest problem in computing the cyclically ad-
justed budget balance is how to estimate the output
gap. There exists no universally accepted way of
doing this. Instead, different methods give different
results and the estimates are often subject to large ex
post revisions. One way of estimating equilibrium
GDP for a country is to use purely statistical techniques
to smooth the actual GDP series. This is typically done by
applying a so-called Hodrick-Prescott filter. With this
measure, one tries to strike a balance between obtaining
a smooth time series for equilibrium (potential) GDP on
the one hand and getting a reasonable fit to the actual
data on the other hand.
The main problem with applying purely statistical
techniques for estimating the output gap is that the
estimates of equilibrium (potential) GDP are also
influenced by actual GDP developments when there
are persistent deviations from equilibrium, for ex-
ample because of prolonged demand disturbances.
This is an argument for instead using a production
function approach, according to which equilibrium
output is estimated on the basis of assessments of
trends in total factor productivity and of the equili-
brium levels of inputs of capital and labour. The
most critical factor with this approach is probably
how to assess the equilibrium employment rate. This
is typically done on the basis of some kind of Phillips
curve approach, where one tries to estimate the
equilibrium unemployment rate consistent with a
constant rate of inflation (NAIRU) or a constant
rate of wage increase (NAWRU) (see, for example,
Calmfors and Uddén Sonnegård, 2001).
Earlier, the Commission and the Ecofin Council based
their calculations of cyclically adjusted budget balances
mainly on Hodrick-Prescott estimations. But the new
Code of Conduct on the content and presentation of
stability and convergence programmes, which was
adopted by the Ecofin Council in 2001, stipulates
that there should be a shift to a production function
method and sets common standards for how the
estimations should be made (European Commis-
sion, 2002a).
The estimates of how the actual budget balance reacts
to variations in the output gap are usually based on as-
sessments of the response of various tax receipts and
government expenditures (see, for example, van den
Noord, 2000). As discussed in Section 1.1, these re-
sponse parameters differ among countries, but an av-
erage value for α  in the EU is around 0.5. This value is
used in Figure 2.2. It must be acknowledged, however,
that estimated budget response parameters reflect
average cyclical variations, so that the actual response
in a specific situation characterised by atypical shocks
may differ substantially from the average pattern. This
is another serious problem when estimating cyclically
adjusted budget balances.
8 See the note to Table 2.7.2.2 The case for revisions of the
EU fiscal policy framework
The EU fiscal rules have been
the subject of intensive discus-
sion both in academic circles
and in more popular contexts.A
common criticism is the arbi-
trariness of the chosen deficit
and debt ceilings as well as of
the long-run budget balance and
(implicit) net debt targets (see,
for example, Buiter et al., 1993;
or Wyplosz, 2002). Other types
of criticism have pointed to the
inappropriateness of focusing on
gross rather than net govern-
ment debt, which also takes into
account government claims on
the private sector or government net worth, which
also includes government real assets (Buiter et al.,
1993).A related argument suggests that it should be
possible to finance government capital outlays
through borrowing (a so-called “golden rule” of the
type presently implemented in the UK; see, for
example, Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2002).
With respect to macroeconomic stabilisation,
which is our main focus here, two main objections
have been raised.The first objection is that the fis-
cal rules may hamper stabilisation efforts in down-
swings (see, for example, Calmfors et al., 1997;
Eichengreen and Wyplosz, 1998; Canzoneri and
Diba, 2001; Swedish Government Commission on
Stabilisation Policy in the EMU, 2002; or Wyplosz,
2002).This has been a common
argument in the recent debate
on the budget deficits in
France, Germany, Italy and
Portugal (de Grauwe, 2002;
Economist, 2002; Financial
Times, 2002a,b,c). A second
objection is that the fiscal rules
provide insufficient incentives
for fiscal restraint in booms by
not rewarding such policies
enough (Bean, 1998; Buti and
Giudice, 2002). As discussed in
last year’s EEAG report, the
risk of fines if the deficit limit is
violated in a recession may not
influence government behav-
iour much in a boom, since the
next recession may then appear very far-off and
may even occur under another government, which
the incumbent goverrnment may have no interest
in helping.9 Such insufficient fiscal restraint in
booms will increase output volatility (both directly
and also indirectly because the scope for counter-
cyclical fiscal policy in future recessions becomes
smaller when the safety margin to the deficit ceil-
ing is reduced10) and weaken the government bud-
get balance over the cycle. Indeed, the current sit-




General government actual fiscal balance (net lending) 
as a percentage of GDP in the EU countries
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Austria – 2.4 – 2.3 – 1.5 0.2 – 1.8 – 1.6
Belgium – 0.7 – 0.5 0.1 0.4 – 0.1 0.0
Germany – 2.2 – 1.5 1.1 – 2.8 – 3.8 – 3.1
Denmark 1.1 3.1 2.5 3.1 2.0 2.0
Spain – 2.7 – 1.1 – 0.6 – 0.1 0.0 – 0.3
Finland 1.3 1.9 7.0 4.9 3.6 3.1
France – 2.7 – 1.6 – 1.3 – 1.4 – 2.7 – 2.9
Greece – 2.5 – 1.9 – 1.8 – 1.2 – 1.3 – 1.1
Ireland 2.4 2.2 4.4 1.5 – 1.0 – 1.2
Italy – 2.8 – 1.8 – 0.5 – 2.2 – 2.4 – 2.2
Luxembourg 3.1 3.6 5.6 6.1 0.5 – 1.8
Netherlands – 0.8 0.7 2.2 0.1 – 0.8 – 1.2
Portugal – 2.6 – 2.4 – 2.9 – 4.1 – 3.4 – 2.9
Sweden 1.9 1.5 3.7 4.8 1.4 1.2
United Kingdom 0.2 1.1 4.0 0.7 1.1 – 1.3
GDP-weighted average – 1.6 – 0.7 1.0 – 0.8 – 1.9 – 1.8
Unweighted average – 0.6 0.1 1.5 0.7 – 0.6 – 0.9
Source: European Commission (2002c).
Table 2.4
General government cyclically adjusted fiscal balance
as a percentage of GDP in the EU countries
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Belgium – 0.6 – 0.9 – 1.1 – 0.3 0.2 0.2
Denmark 0.5 2.5 1.3 2.6 2.1 2.1
Germany – 1.9 – 1.4 – 1.9 – 2.8 – 3.3 – 2.4
Greece – 1.9 – 1.6 – 1.8 – 2.1 – 1.7 – 1.8
Spain – 2.6 – 1.5 – 1.4 – 0.7 – 0.1 – 0.2
France – 2.6 – 2.0 – 2.1 – 2.0 – 2.7 – 2.8
Ireland 1.9 0.8 2.5 0.2 – 1.4 – 0.8
Italy – 3.0 – 1.9 – 2.1 – 2.4 – 1.8 – 1.6
Netherlands – 1.9 – 1.2 – 0.6 – 1.2 – 0.6 0.0
Austria – 2.4 – 2.5 – 2.5 0.0 – 1.6 – 1.4
Portugal – 3.0 – 3.0 – 4.0 – 4.3 – 3.0 – 1.9
Finland – 0.4 0.3 3.8 3.8 3.7 3.3
Sweden 2.3 0.6 2.1 4.2 1.3 1.3
United Kingdom – 0.3 0.8 1.2 0.7 – 0.6 – 0.9
GDP-weighted average – 1.7 – 1.0 – 1.0 – 1.2 – 1.6 – 1.4
Unweighted average – 1.1 – 0.8 – 0.5 – 0.3 – 0.7 – 0.5
Source: European Commission (2002c).
9 One should note the similarity between this argument and the
argument that incumbent governments may choose deficit policies
to constrain the possibilities of future governments of other politi-
cal colours to favour their constituencies.
10 See also the discussion in Section 1.1.EEAG Report 57
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vide good examples of how such insufficient fiscal
restraint in the 1999–2000 upswings have created
deficit problems in the subsequent recession (see
Tables 2.3 and 2.4).
A very different type of critique has focused on the
difficulties of applying the fiscal rules in concrete
situations.The argument is that it will be difficult in
practice to fine a member state that exceeds the
deficit ceiling (Calmfors et al., 1997; Uhlig, 2002).
Such actions are likely to arouse serious political
conflicts among the member states. It may also be
difficult to explain to the general public that the
proper way of handling a deficit situation in a
country is to incur extra expenditures in the form
of fines to the European neighbours. The decision
of the Council in early 2002 to avoid giving
Germany and Portugal early warnings for the devi-
ations relative to the agreed budget targets,despite
a recommendation from the Commission to do so,
provides a clear illustration of the difficulties of
applying the rules in practice. So does the present
situation,in which the budgetary problems in some
member states have led to demands that the SGP
should be flouted.
The objections we have summarised all raise high-
ly relevant issues. But it is also clear that any fiscal
rule has to reflect a difficult trade-off between
what would be theoretically optimal and simplicity.
A rule must be simple to facilitate monitoring and
enforcement (Kopits and Symansky, 1997).
Simplicity is also required if the rule is to be under-
stood by the general public.Otherwise the rule will
not command the legitimacy necessary for it to be
respected by policy makers and be sustainable in
the long run. Simplicity of the rules is probably of
extra importance in the context of the EU, which
has often been accused of being too technocratic.
In our view, the provisions in the Maastricht Treaty
and the SGP do, on the whole, represent a reason-
able trade-off between conflicting demands and
have played a very useful role for strengthening
fiscal discipline. The rules have become common
knowledge and are a useful common benchmark
for fiscal policy in the member countries.
At the same time, it should be acknowledged that
the fiscal rules were instituted in a specific historic
situation. There was an urgent need for reversing
the trend of rapidly accumulating government debt
and to quickly establish credibility for the new cur-
rency in its initial phase. Once the monetary union
has been shown to work, it might be possible to
refine the fiscal rules more than was possible in the
1990s.
One counter argument is that such modifications
might undermine the credibility of any common
EU fiscal rules by creating the impression that they
can always be revised in response to the existing
situation. These are crucial considerations, but it
must also be recognised that if the rules are per-
ceived as being too inflexible, they will lose their
legitimacy. The likely consequence of this is either
that the rules will be constantly bent or that they
will at some point be abandoned altogether.
A reasonable conclusion is that one should look
for possible modifications of the fiscal rules that
enhance their effectiveness and legitimacy without
changing their main character. As argued in last
year’s EEAG report (EEAG, 2002), there is an
obvious case in favour of formulating the medium-
term budget balance objective explicitly in cyclical-
ly adjusted terms in order to allow the automatic
stabilisers to work. We therefore fully endorse the
Commission’s recent proposals on this (European
Commission, 2002b). In addition, as discussed in
Section 1, there are strong arguments for allowing
discretionary fiscal policy action, that is variations
in the cyclically adjusted budget balance, in some
situations. These could involve large asymmetries
in cyclical developments among the euro countries
or large common macroeconomic disturbances
where monetary policy needs to be supported by
fiscal policy.
It would not be appropriate, however, to formulate
the deficit ceiling in terms of the cyclically adjust-
ed budget balance rather than in terms of the actu-
al balance. The obvious reason is that there is no
unique way of adjusting the actual budget balance
for cyclical factors. Different methods of calculat-
ing the cyclically adjusted balance give different
results, as discussed in Box 2.1. In addition, the cal-
culations are frequently revised ex post. One can-
not base sanctions on a measure that is so open to
different interpretations.
As argued in Box 2.2, there is a strong case in all
EU member states for trying to attain average bud-
get outcomes of “close to balance or in surplus”,o r
even more ambitious budget goals, over the com-
ing decade(s), because of the future strains on gov-
ernment finances due to demographic develop-ments. In this situation, it would seem very unwise
to loosen the budget objectives, for example
through the adoption of a so-called “golden rule”,
which would allow borrowing for government
investment or other selected government expendi-
tures believed to promote growth. The arguments






A common criticism of the Stability and Growth Pact is
that the medium-term budget target of “close to balan-
ce or in surplus” is arbitrary. It is often claimed to be
too ambitious as it implies that net government debt
will over time converge to around zero (see, for ex-
ample, de Grauwe, 2002; or Walton, 2002).
It is true that theoretical analysis does not give much
guidance on what is an optimal level of long-run gov-
ernment debt, although it points to various important
aspects (Kell, 2001; Wyplosz, 2002):
•From the point of view of minimising long-run tax
distortions that reduce social efficiency, a low debt
level (or a positive net financial position) for the gov-
ernment is desirable.
•On the other hand, to the extent that households are
credit-constrained, social welfare is increased if gov-
ernments can borrow on their behalf.
•Intergenerational equity is affected by the level of
debt, since this influences how consumption possibili-
ties are distributed across generations.
None of these considerations have played a major role
in the choice of budget targets (and thus implicitly also
of debt targets) in the SGP. Instead, as discussed in Sec-
tion 2, more pragmatic considerations relating to long-
run fiscal sustainability have dominated. The aim has
been to lower debt to prudent levels in order to reduce
the risks of inflation and high interest rates. In such a
perspective, the future strains on government budgets
that can be expected from ageing populations (due
both to higher pension payments and higher health-re-
lated government expenditures) become of paramount
importance. Table 2.5 (p. 60) presents estimates by the
Economic and Financial Committee in the EU of fu-
ture expenditure increases due to demographic develop-
ments. As can be seen, such projections indicate an
average increase in age-related government expendi-
tures of 6.2 percent of GDP in the EU countries be-
tween 2000 and 2040. The estimated increases are lar-
gest in Greece, the Netherlands, Spain, and Finland
(7–13 percent of GDP), but much smaller in the UK,
Italy, and Sweden (0–4 percent of GDP). Needless to
say, the calculations are based on a number of uncer-
tain assumptions, for example regarding labour force
participation and unchanged policies (implying, for ex-
ample, substantial reductions of pension replacement
rates in Italy and the UK). The projections do not take
into account that there is some reduction in other age-
related expenditures, like for childcare. The calcula-
tions are also before tax, so that they do not measure
the net effects on the government budget balance. Still,
the calculations illustrate clearly that ageing popula-
tions will result in large budgetary pressures.
Further reductions of government debt, and thus also of
interest payments, is one way of accommodating the ten-
dencies to deteriorating primary budget balances (the
balances excluding interest payments). Table 2.6 (p. 61) is
an attempt to illustrate this in a very simplified manner.
Column 1 shows the 2001 primary balances. Column 2
shows the primary surpluses necessary to service
interest payments if the debt-to-GDP ratio were to
stay at the 2001 level. The other columns show how
much lower primary surpluses need to be from 2020
and onwards, as compared to this benchmark, under
various assumptions on total budget balances
(including interest payments) in the period 2001–20
if the debt-to-GDP ratio is to be held stationary
after this period. The assumptions that fiscal policies
can be characterised by various assumptions on the
total budget balance up to 2020 and that the debt le-
vels after that are stabilised at the 2020 level are
arbitrary, but serve as a crude illustration of the extent
to which the future demands on primary budget
surpluses are affected by present policies.
Our calculations illustrate that the future reductions
in required primary surpluses that follow from pre-
sent policies (and also from more ambitious ones)
are small relative to the budgetary strains imposed
by ageing populations. The average reduction in re-
quired primary surpluses from the debt reduction
associated with zero budget balances in 2001–20 as
compared with present debt levels is only 0.7 per-
cent of GDP (1.2–0.5). Budget deficits of 1.5 per-
cent of GDP instead of zero balance would yield a
reduction of the average required primary surplus
by only 0.3 percent of GDP (1.2–0.9). A total budget
surplus in 2001–20 of 3 percent of GDP implies a re-
duction of the average required primary balance by
1.5 percentage points, allowing a small average pri-
mary deficit after 2020. The effects are of different
magnitude for different countries, the largest effects
occurring for the countries with the largest initial
debt levels (Italy, Belgium and Greece).
In the perspective of Table 2.6, it is difficult to claim
that the present “close to balance or in surplus” tar-
get is too ambitious. The projected increase in age-
related expenditures is a strong argument against
relaxing the budgetary objectives, for example by
adopting a “golden rule”, according to which gov-
ernment investment can be financed through bor-
rowing. Rather, if anything, there appears to be a
strong case for sharpening the medium-term fiscal
objectives in most countries as a complement to




The “golden rule” in public finance is the notion that
borrowing should be allowed for public investment.
Such a golden rule for both the federal government
and the states is formally enshrined in the German
constitution. More recently, the UK has adopted such a
rule, according to which deficit financing of govern-
ment net investment is allowed, provided that the
overall government debt is kept at prudent levels (at
present defined as a ratio of net government debt to
GDP below 40 percent) (see Buiter, 2001; or Kell,
2001). In the discussion of the Stability and Growth
Pact, it has been argued that the present medium-term
objective of “close to balance or in surplus” should be
replaced by a golden rule, which would also require a
redefinition of the deficit ceiling in the Treaty (see, for
example, Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2002).
The crucial issue when judging the future budgetary
consequences of a public investment project is whether
it generates a cash flow accruing to the general gov-
ernment, whose (appropriately measured) present val-
ue is at least equal to its financial costs for the govern-
ment. If this is the case, deficit financing of public in-
vestment does not cause a deterioration of future
budget balances and does not require any future rises
in tax rates or cuts in spending. Otherwise, the struc-
tural deficit will be worsened to the extent that future
additions to tax revenue fall short of interest costs of
the additional debt.
In principle, the statements above could be turned into
a test to discriminate among different public invest-
ment projects. According to this test, projects meeting
a minimum cash-flow requirement could be excluded
from the deficit figure subject to the rules of the SGP.
Government borrowing would be disallowed only for
the costs of those projects failing the test. 
These considerations show that a “golden rule” should
never be applied mechanically. Rather, it should al-
ways be made conditional on an assessment of the fu-
ture financial flows from public investment. This is be-
cause nothing requires the public sector to undertake
projects only if they satisfy the test specified above.
The provision of public goods requiring public invest-
ment may well be motivated by their utility value, inde-
pendent of whether or not it can generate a positive
cash flow. Many projects may be highly desirable, yet
require tax financing.
But even such a stricter and sounder golden rule would
run into a number of theoretical and practical objec-
tions that strongly discourage its application. First and
foremost, it is very difficult to assess future revenues
accruing to the general government. Such an assess-
ment is necessarily based on arbitrary assumptions,
and these assumptions are unavoidably open to mani-
pulation. Typically, one should take both direct and in-
direct public revenues into account. An example of the
latter is any increase in tax revenue due to incomes that
would not be generated in the absence of public in-
vestment. However, proponents of a particular project,
and groups benefiting directly from it, will have strong
opportunistic motives to inflate the estimates of the
indirect effects. Also, as amply documented, inadequate
budgeting and implementation of public investment
projects typically result in cost revisions, systematically
reducing net cash flows well below the initial estimates.
Moreover, the classification of public expenditures
between  “current expenditures” and “investment” is
quite ambiguous. For example, should spending on
public education be viewed as public investment in
human capital? And why should tax cuts that stimulate
private investment be treated differently from direct
government investment? Adopting a golden rule will
clearly create a strong incentive to reclassify many items
in the budget, with no other purpose than to circumvent
the Stability and Growth Pact. 
Second, suppose that the public sector can accurately
predict cash flows, and is able to commit itself to ex-
tremely disciplined control procedures. Even so, it is
quite difficult to identify the correct interest costs. For
instance, a large programme of public investment could
change the equilibrium interest rate in the economy:
using interest rates prevailing before the implementation
of the program would therefore not be appropriate.
The recent revival of the debate on the golden rule
may actually divert attention from a deeper issue. Fis-
cal retrenchment implemented by several countries in
the euro area throughout the 1990s resulted in large
cuts in public capital expenditure. As is well under-
stood, the interest groups fighting cuts in public in-
vestment are not as strong and vocal as the interest
groups opposing cuts in current transfers programs.
Public capital investment tends to have diffuse effects
and – more importantly – tends to benefit both current
and future generations.
Intergenerational redistribution via public capital is a
theme that is often forgotten in the political debate. An
inefficiently low level of public infrastructure, and a
low quality, can harm future generations at least as
much as higher future taxes financing present transfers.
In many areas, a reduced presence of the public sector
has crowded in private investment, substituting private
for public capital. But especially for infrastructure,
there is a widespread feeling that development and
maintenance have been falling below efficient levels.
Is this an argument to relax budget goals? What is
called into question is not really budget discipline – but
the political priorities in the national budget process as
well as budget choices at the European level. If the in-
vestment in infrastructure is too low, which creates
large welfare costs for current and future generations,
governments can change spending plans or find proper
ways to finance additional spending. In this respect, it
should be kept in mind that deficit financing of in-We view the existing EU fiscal rules as a valuable
institutional framework that should be exploited,
because other alternatives will involve new and high
set-up costs. This is an argument of history depen-
dence. Given that the present framework is there,
there is a strong case for continuing to build on it.
This requires that the credibility of the fiscal rules is
maintained. In particular, any changes in the fiscal
rules must not be perceived as giving in to claims
from member states that have current difficulties.
Recent proposals of the European Commission aim
at making the fiscal rules more
flexible through a reinterpreta-
tion of the Stability and Growth
Pact, which would not require
any Treaty changes (European
Commission, 2002b). The pro-
posals focus mainly on the medi-
um-term budget target, but not
on the deficit ceiling. In our
view, this is insufficient and
potentially harmful. More fun-
damental changes, involving a
revision of the Maastricht
Treaty, are desirable.
The most important stipulations
on fiscal policy are those that
refer to excessive deficits. The
possibility of sanctions has much
stronger incentive effects than
other stipulations and forms the
backbone of the fiscal rules.So,we believe that more
of the discussion should focus on this aspect.We see
two desirable changes in the excessive deficit proce-
dure:
• To condition the scope for stabilisation policy in
downswings on the level of debt, so that low-
debt countries are allowed to run larger deficits
than high-debt countries.
• To depoliticise the decision-making process that
establishes whether or not individual countries




vestment generates future interest payments – pay-
ments that are avoided if investment is tax-financed.
So, requiring tax financing does not impose any
additional burden on taxpayers in the long run. It
does, however, give rise to redistribution effects in
favour of future generations in the short and medium
run.
In principle, the golden rule could be defended as a
way to make future generations sustain the costs of
infrastructure projects that will also benefit them. By
the same token, it is well known that efficiency (tax-
smoothing) arguments suggest the desirability of
deficit financing at an early stage of development:
countries starting with a low capital stock have
a large need to build infrastructure, and should the-
refore be given the financial flexibility to do so. Whi-
le all this is true, it should not be forgotten that what
motivated the Stability and Growth Pact is exactly
the argument according to which sound economic
principles are seldom followed in the actual
budget process.
Recently, a common misinterpretation of public finance
principles has been that there is a case for excluding
military spending from the budget objectives according
to the SGP. It is true that the tax smoothing principle
implies that any temporary upsurge in military spending
should be financed by borrowing, and not by increasing
taxes, because this avoids welfare-decreasing variations
in private consumption. But in the case of Europe, those
who believe in a larger military role for the EU advocate
a permanent (rather than temporary) step-up of defence
spending. While the choice of increasing military spend-
ing is a political one – and there is by no means an
agreement on whether and how much the EU
should change its course on this matter – there is no
economic argument for deficit financing.
Table 2.5
Projected increases in age-related public expenditures 
in the EU countries in percent of GDP, 2000 – 2040
Health care Long-term care
Pensions expenditures expenditures Total
Austria 3.8 1.6 0.7 6.2
Belgium 3.7 1.3 0.7 5.7
Denmark 3.6 0.7 1.8 6.1
Finland 4.7 1.2 1.6 7.5
France 3.8 1.2 0.4 5.4
Germany 4.8 1.4 na (6.2)
Greece 11.2 1.5 na (12.7)
Ireland 3.6 1.9 0.1 5.6
Italy 1.9 1.4 0.3 3.6
Luxembourg 2.2 na na (2.2)
Netherlands 6.2 1.0 1.8 8.9
Portugal 4.0 0.6 1.6 6.3
Spain 6.6 1.5 na (8.1)
Sweden 2.4 0.9 0.6 3.9
United Kingdom – 0.5 0.8 0.0 0.3
Unweighted average 4.1 (1.2) (0.9) (6.2)
Note: Figures are given in parenthesis when there are missing data.
Source: Table II.7, European Commission (2002a).EEAG Report 61
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2.3.An enhanced role for the debt level as a fiscal
policy criterion
As discussed in the previous section, the current EU
fiscal rules assign more importance to the current
budget balance than to the debt level. This can be
criticised on the grounds that the amount of debt is a
more relevant variable if one is concerned about
long-run fiscal sustainability and price stability
(Beetsma, 2001; Canzoneri and Diba, 2001). On the
other hand, the current budget situation is likely to
be a better predictor of future budget outcomes than
the historic debt level (Perotti et al., 1998). From a
more practical standpoint, the focus on the budget
balance rather than on debt in the Maastricht Treaty
was probably motivated to a large extent by the
great dispersion in debt levels among the prospec-
tive entrants to EMU (see Table 2.2), which made it
difficult to use debt as a convergence criterion if one
wanted to achieve the joint objectives of giving
everyone a reasonable chance of qualifying and dis-
ciplining fiscal behaviour. Another motivation was
the larger ambiguities associated with measuring the
debt level than the current budget balance.
We find it a reasonable argument that the present
fiscal rules do not allow countries with low govern-
ment debt to reap the full benefits of this situation
(Pisani-Ferry, 2002). Indeed, a main benefit of low
government debt should be to enhance the room
for manoeuvre in stabilisation policy by allowing
larger deficits in recessions than would otherwise
be possible (Swedish Government Commission on
Stabilisation Policy in the EMU, 2002).This can be
seen as a corollary to the common argument that a
track record of low inflation for a central bank
should enhance the scope for interest rate cuts in a
downswing.
According to the present fiscal rules, there is an
association between the debt level and the scope
for stabilisation policy, but it is implicit rather than
explicit. One association is the stipulation that
countries with a debt ratio higher than 60 percent
are not allowed to increase it,which may be a more
binding constraint for these countries than the
deficit ceiling, whereas there is no such stipulation
for countries with lower debt ratios (Balassone and
Monacelli, 2000). Table 2.7 shows the maximum
deficits at various debt levels and growth rates
consistent with the condition that the debt ratio
must not increase.The debt change stipulation has
the peculiar implication that it constrains the size
of deficits more the closer the debt ratio is to the
Table 2.6
Required primary surpluses in the EU countries to stabilise the debt ratio after 2020 under various assumptions
(debt ratios in paranthesis)
Current cyclically Required primary Required primary surplus at various annual total budget 
adjusted primary surplus at balances 2001 – 2020
surplus (2001) current debt
Country level (2001) – 3 – 1.5 0 1.5 3
Austria – 0.1 1.2 ( 61.7) 1.3 (66.0) 0.9 (46.3) 0.5 (26.6) 0.1 ( 6.9) – 0.2 (– 12.8)
Belgium 6.2 2.1 (107.5) 1.7 (87.4) 1.3 (67.5) 0.9 (47.6) 0.5 ( 27.7) 0.2 ( 7.7)
Germany 0.7 1.2 ( 59.8) 1.2 (63.4) 0.9 (44.0) 0.5 (24.7) 0.1 ( 5.3) – 0.3 (– 14.0)
Denmark 6.7 0.9 ( 44.5) 1.2 (62.6) 0.8 (42.0) 0.4 (21.4) 0.0 ( 0.8) – 0.4 (– 19.8)
Spain 2.4 1.1 ( 57.2) 1.2 (59.2) 0.8 (40.4) 0.4 (21.7) 0.1 ( 3.0) – 0.3 (– 15.7)
Finland 6.3 0.9 ( 43.6) 1.2 (60.1) 0.8 (40.0) 0.4 (19.8) 0.0 (– 0.3) – 0.4 (– 20.4)
France 1.5 1.1 ( 57.2) 1.3 (65.0) 0.9 (45.1) 0.5 (25.2) 0.1 ( 5.3) – 0.3 ((– 14.5)
United Kingdom 3.0 0.8 ( 39.0) 1.1 (55.8) 0.7 (36.2) 0.3 (16.6) – 0.1 (– 3.0) – 0.4 (– 22.6)
Greece 5.5 1.9 ( 99.7) 1.7 (87.3) 1.3 (66.9) 0.9 (46.6) 0.5 ( 26.2) 0.1 ( 5.9)
Ireland 1.4 0.7 ( 36.6) 0.8 (38.4) 0.5 (23.2) 0.2 ( 8.0) – 0.1 (– 7.2) 0.4 (– 22.5)
Italy 4.9 2.1 (109.4) 1.8 (93.0) 1.4 (72.5) 1.0 (52.0) 0.6 ( 31.5) 0.2 ( 11.0)
Luxembourg 3.8 0.1 ( 5.5) 0.6 (32.5) 0.3 (16.9) 0.0 ( 1.3) – 0.3 (– 14.3) – 0.6 (– 29.9)
Netherlands 3.1 1.0 ( 53.2) 1.2 (60.0) 0.8 (40.8) 0.4 (21.6) 0.0 ( 2.4) – 0.3 (– 16.9)
Portugal 0.1 1.1 ( 55.6) 1.1 (56.9) 0.8 (38.5) 0.4 (20.1) 0.0 ( 1.7) – 0.3 (– 16.6)
Sweden 7.6 1.1 ( 56.0) 1.3 (68.0) 0.9 (47.4) 0.5 (26.9) 0.1 ( 6.3) – 0.3 (– 14.3)
Unweighted average 3.5 1.2 ( 59.1) 1.2 (63.7) 0.9 (44.5) 0.5 (25.3) 0.1 ( 6.2) – 0.3 (– 13.0)
Note: Column 1 gives the current (2001) primary budget balance (the budget balance excluding interest payments). Column 2 gives the
primary balance necessary to stabilise government debt at its current (2001) value (with the debt level in parenthesis). The subsequent
columns show the primary balances necessary to stabilise government debt from 2020 and onwards under various assumptions on the
total annual budget balance (including interest payments) in 2001 – 2020. The stationary debt levels are given in parenthesis. Annual
real GDP growth for each country in 2001 – 2020 is assumed to be the same as the average for 1985 – 2001. Annual inflation in 2001–2020
is assumed to be 2 percent. From 2020 and onwards, nominal GDP growth in all countries have been set equal to the average real GDP
growth for all EU countries in 1985 – 2001 plus 2 percent. The nominal interest rate is assumed to be 2 percentage points higher than the
nominal growth rate.
Source: Columns 1 and 2: European Commission. The other columns: computations by EEAG group and José Mauricio Prado.60 percent reference value. For example, assuming
a 3 percent nominal growth rate, the maximum
deficit is 2.9 percent of GDP at a 100 percent debt
ratio, whereas it is only 1.7 percent at a 60 percent
debt ratio. This follows from the fact that nominal
GDP growth automatically tends to reduce the
debt-to-GDP ratio less the lower this ratio, requir-
ing lower deficits if the ratio is not to increase.
However, it is not clear how much emphasis is in
practice likely to be put on the debt change stipu-
lation. Against the letter of the Treaty, it was
ignored as a convergence criterion for Germany,
which violated it at the start of EMU. Nor has the
debt change criterion received much attention in
the recent discussion, although Italy is likely to
have violated it in 2002 and Germany is likely to do
so in 2003 (see Table 2.2).
There is also an indirect association between the
scope for stabilisation policy and the debt level, as
low debt implies lower interest payments. For
example, assuming a 4 percent average interest
rate on government debt, a reduction of the debt
ratio from 50 percent to 25 percent of GDP would
reduce interest payments as a ratio of GDP by
1 percentage point (from 2 to 1 percent). Ceteris
paribus this would improve the total budget bal-
ance.This assumes,however,that the lower interest
payments have not been offset by a deterioration
of the primary budget balance (the budget balance
excluding interest payments) through tax cuts or
expenditure increases. One could also argue that
there should be a positive association between low
debt and strong government budget positions
because low debt can only have been achieved
through small deficits or through surpluses in the
past, and budget situations tend to exhibit a high
degree of persistence (Perotti et al., 1998).
According to this argument,a low debt level would
be associated with a high probability of a strong
current government budget position, which gives a
large cyclical safety margin in a downswing. But on
the other hand, we know from empirical studies of
the determinants of the government budget bal-
ance that high debt is conducive to low deficits
(high surpluses), as it creates pressure for adjust-
ment (see, for example, von Hagen et al., 2002).
Finally, the Council is likely in practice to take into
account the debt position of a country when judg-
ing whether the escape clause allowing violations
of the deficit ceiling in certain situations can be
invoked, even if this is not formally stated (see
Section 2.1).
The recent Commission proposals on reinterpret-
ing the SGP involve a greater emphasis on debt
(European Commission, 2002b). First, it is argued
that the debt change criterion should be taken seri-
ously and that breaches of it should trigger the
excessive deficit procedure. Second, the Com-
mission has proposed that member states with debt
lower than 60 percent of GDP should be given the
possibility of small temporary deviations from the
“close to balance or in surplus” target for the cycli-
cally adjusted budget balance if these deviations
derive from a “large structural reform” aiming at
promoting growth. A third proposal is that “small
deviations of a longer-term nature” from the “close
to balance or in surplus” objective could also be
envisaged for member states with debt ratios “well
below the 60 percent reference value”.
We see two major problems with the Commission’s
proposals. One is the increased complexity of the
rules and the amount of discretionary judgements
introduced.Another problem is that loosening the
medium-term fiscal objective without changing the
deficit ceiling reduces the safety margins and thus
increases the risk that the ceiling is breached.
In our view, a better plan for reforming the fiscal
framework should instead focus on the deficit ceil-
ing directly. There should be a clear and transpar-
ent rule. One possibility would be to condition the
deficit ceiling explicitly on the debt level, allowing
low-debt countries to run larger deficits in down-
swings than high-debt countries. More precisely,
low-debt countries could be allowed to run larger
budget deficits than three percent of GDP. Such a








growth rate 60 70 80 90 100
3% 1.7 2.0 2.3 2.6 2.9
4% 2.3 2.7 3.1 3.5 3.8
5% 2.9 3.3 3.8 4.3 4.8
Note: The change in the debt-to-GDP ratio, d, is given by
∆ dt = –bt –φ  (1+φ )dt-1, where b is the budget balance in
percent of GDP and φ  is the rate of growth of nominal
GDP. The deficits in the table are obtained by setting
∆ dt = 0 and solving for bt.
Source: Calculations by EEAG group.EEAG Report 63
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1. The scope is widened for low-debt countries to
pursue expansionary fiscal policy in a down-
swing.
2. The incentives for fiscal restraint in general are
enhanced if the returns to such policies in the
form of a greater scope for stabilisation policy
in downswings become higher and more visible.
3. The stronger incentives for fiscal discipline
imply smaller risks of procyclical policies in
booms.
4. To the extent that the advantages of fiscal disci-
pline become larger, the legitimacy of the fiscal
rules and thus their credibility would be
enhanced.
Technically, a link between the deficit ceiling and
the debt level could be established in several ways.
One could simply stipulate different deficit ceilings
for different debt intervals. One proposal, which
raises the deficit ceiling for low-debt countries but
leaves it unchanged for high-debt countries, is
given in the first column of Table 2.8 (see also
Calmfors and Corsetti, 2002a,b). An alternative
would be a scheme like the one in the second col-
umn,according to which the rises in the deficit ceil-
ing for low-debt countries are matched by reduc-
tions for high-debt countries. The latter proposal
may appear less politically realistic, but it could
perhaps be made more attractive if it is linked to a
formal abolition of the debt change criterion for
the countries exceeding the 60 percent debt-to-
GDP reference value. A lower deficit ceiling for
these countries would serve the same purpose as
the debt change criterion, but do away with the
anomaly that present rules formally require lower
maximum deficits for high-debt countries the clos-
er their debt ratio is to the 60 percent value.
A major advantage of such discontinuous “lad-
ders” of deficit ceilings as shown in Table 2.8 is that
they provide a strong incentive for fiscal discipline
in normal times as well as in booms by allowing
countries to move to categories with a higher “sta-
tus”. Even if it is future governments that would
get the advantage of a greater scope for stabilisa-
tion policy in recessions, it becomes much more
visible to the general public that the incumbent
government has made an investment that repre-
sents a future gain.11
An alternative set-up would be to retain the present
three-percent deficit ceiling, but allow countries to
use extra-budgetary stabilisation funds in down-
swings that are not formally included under the
deficit ceiling. Such so-called “rainy-day funds” exist
in many US states and Canadian provinces as a cush-
ion against unforeseen contingencies (Kopits and
Symansky, 1997; Knight and Levinson, 1999;
McGranahan, 1999; Hemming and Kell, 2000) and
have been discussed in the European context by Buti
and Giudice (2002) and Buti et al. (2002). A system
with such funds could be constructed so as to mimic
debt-deficit links of the type
indicated by Rule 1 in Table 2.8.
Countries with debts below
given thresholds would be
allowed to establish such funds
and to draw maximum pre-spec-
ified amounts from them in
recessions,in addition to running
deficits in the normal budget up
to three percent of GDP. One
possibility is to let countries with
government debt ratios below
certain thresholds establish the
stabilisation funds immediately
through borrowing, which would
Table 2.8
Possible ways of conditioning the deficit ceiling on the debt ratio
Debt ratio Deficit ceiling (percent of GDP)
(percent of GDP)
Rule 1 Rule 2 Countries in the debt range
> 105 3.0 0.5 Italy
95 – 105 3.0 1.0 Belgium, Greece
85 – 95 3.0 1.5
75 – 85 3.0 2.0
65 – 75 3.0 2.5
55 – 65 3.0 3.0 Portugal, France, Germany, Austria,
Bulgaria
45 – 55 3.5 3.5 Netherlands, Sweden, Spain, Hungary
35 – 45 4.0 4.0 Ireland, UK, Finland, Denmark, Slovak 
Republic, Poland
25 – 35 4.5 4.5 Czech Republic, Slovenia
< 25 5.0 5.0 Luxembourg, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Romania
Note: Accession countries in italics. These countries have been classified above
according to their debt ratios in 2002. The incumbent EU member states have been
classified according to predicted debt ratios in 2003.
Source: See Tables 2.2 and 2.9.
11 In addition, one can, of course, also
institute a rule that a procyclical loosen-
ing of fiscal policy in a boom represents a
violation of the budgetary requirements
in the SGP, as proposed by the
Commission (European Commission,
2002b). But one would expect our pro-
posal to have more bite, as it does not
require discretionary decision-making.increase gross (but not net) government debt, or by
transferring claims on the private sector to them.
Another more demanding option is to let low-debt
countries build up the funds over time by chan-
nelling government surpluses into them in good
times.
A system of extra-budgetary “rainy-day-funds”
could formally maintain the three-percent ceiling
as the point of reference. It would “lock in” the
assets put in the funds by earmarking them only for
stabilisation of output and employment in reces-
sions. Arguably, however, a system of extra-bud-
getary funds is less transparent than a system that
explicitly conditions the deficit ceiling on the debt
level.
How would the accession countries be affected by
rules that explicitly condition the deficit ceiling on
the debt level? The accession countries have on
average much lower government debt than the
present EU member states (see Table 2.9).
Therefore, a rule that relates the maximum deficit
to the debt level gives them more scope for stabil-
isation policy in downswings than the incumbent
member states. This could be motivated to the
extent that the accession countries are likely to be
exposed to larger cyclical swings, as they are in a
phase of transition to developed market econo-
mies.It is true that this could also involve risks that
serious budgetary imbalances develop, as there are
some tendencies to (see Table 2.9). But on the
other hand the accession countries will also have a
stronger tendency to reduce their debt ratios than
the present EU member states because they will
have higher nominal GDP growth.This is the con-
sequence of both higher convergence-driven real
GDP growth, as they catch up with Western
Europe in terms of income per capita, and higher
inflation due to the Balassa-Samuelson effect
(according to which higher productivity growth in
the tradables sector in catching-up countries than
in already rich countries leads to higher wage
growth and thus to higher price rises in the non-
tradable sector, as discussed in EEAG, 2002).12
We believe there is a case for revision of the fiscal
rules in the EU along the lines we have proposed.
We have deliberately chosen the debt intervals in
Table 2.8 such that our reform proposals would not
accommodate the current budget problems of
France, Germany, Portugal and Italy. The former
three countries will all have debt-to-GDP ratios in
2003 of close to 60 percent and Italy has a ratio of
close to 110 percent. It is true that the recent dete-
rioration of the budget balances in these countries
is associated with the workings of the automatic
stabilisers, which dampen the present cyclical
downswing. The root cause of the current bud-
getary problems is insufficient fiscal retrenchment
in the preceding boom. Relaxing the rules such as
to accommodate the current situation would, how-
ever, completely undermine the credibility of fiscal
constraints at the EU level. It is not a good strate-
gy to try to solve short-term problems by adjusting
the long-term rules. The budget developments in
some member states might imply that they are in
the end fined if there is a drawn-out recession.This
may not be all bad. Once a member state like
Germany has been exposed to such fines, there
would be little doubt that the sanction procedures
are credible.
The current German situation may seem particu-
larly awkward, as there are
indications of a much larger
negative output gap than in
other euro countries (see
Chapter 1). One possibility that
should be considered is
whether demand could be
boosted through a ”tax shift”,




The fiscal position of accession countries in 2002
Gross government debt  General government actual
as a percentage  fiscal balance in percent
of GDP  of GDP
Bulgaria 58.1 – 0.8
Czech Republic 25.6 – 6.4
Estonia 4.4 – 0.2
Hungary 52.9 – 5.7
Latvia 16.8 – 1.8
Lithuania 23.6 – 1.9
Poland 43.3 – 4.1
Romania 24.6 – 2.7
Slovak Republic 39.3 – 4.6
Slovenia 27.9 – 1.8
Unweighted average 31.7 – 3.0
Source: Tables 9 and 10 in European Commission (2002d).
12 Due to the initially low debt levels and
the tendency to large debt-to-GDP
reductions following from high nominal
GDP growth, our proposed link between
debt and deficit ceiling is also likely to
give the accession countries more scope
for investment in public infrastructure
than the incumbent EU member states,
which would seem desirable.EEAG Report 65
Chapter 2
employers’ payroll taxes that is financed by
increases in taxes that fall on employees, such as
employee contributions to the social security sys-
tem, income taxes or VAT. Such a tax reform rep-
Box 2.4
Different measures of the government’s financial situation
The gross government debt concept used in the Maas-
tricht Treaty is only one of several possible measures of
the government’s financial position. This box reviews
various measures.
•Gross government debt nets out all claims and liabili-
ties within the government sector, but claims on the
private sector are not included.
•Another debt concept is net government debt, which
deducts government claims on the private sector
from the gross debt.
•Conventional measures of government gross and net
debt do not take account of pension obligations, but
only refer to explicit debt. Pension obligations can be
thought of as “implicit debt”. Yet another measure is
thus total explicit and implicit debt.
•If one adds in the real capital assets of the govern-
ment, one obtains the net worth of the government.
Theoretically, net worth is the most relevant measure
of the government’s solvency (Buiter et al., 1993; Bui-
ter, 2001; Balassone and Franco, 2000) Real capital as-
sets must then be assessed according to market values
and not according to historic costs, as it is the ability to
generate future revenues that is of interest. However,
in practice there are huge problems of evaluation.
Theoretically, net debt is also a more relevant concept
for government solvency than gross debt, as a govern-
ment can in principle draw on claims on the private sec-
tor. But here, too, there may be problems of evaluation
(although smaller than for real capital assets). For ex-
ample, many government loans to the private sectors
may be “soft ones” with a large ingredient of subsidisa-
tion (this is likely to be a severe problem in the transi-
tion economies in Eastern Europe) (Buiter et al., 1993;
Föttinger, 2001).
It is not self-evident how implicit pension debt should
be regarded, since pension obligations are less firm
than ordinary debt obligations. On the one hand,
pension obligations are a policy variable that is subject
to possible change through reforms of pension systems.
On the other hand, there is a political commitment to
honour these obligations. Similarly, one could argue
that there are very strong commitments also to some
other government expenditures, such as health care
and long-term care expenditures. By also regarding the
path of such expenditures as exogenous (for example,
by assuming age-related spending increases, as dis-
cussed in Box 2.2), and by assuming unchanged
policies with respect to taxes and other expenditure
categories, one can forecast future budget balances.
Computing the discounted present value of such tax
and expenditure streams yields a “broader” measure
of implicit debt, albeit one that can more easily be
changed through policy action. Adding “implicit debt”
calculated in this way to explicit debt is one way of
assessing the need for fiscal adjustment in order to
ensure fiscal sustainability. Alternatively, fiscal sustain-
ability indicators can be expressed as the immediate and
permanent change in the budget balance necessary to
meet various definitions of long-run fiscal sustainability
(Blanchard et al., 1990; Balassone and Franco, 2000).
It is a general rule that the more theoretically relevant
the measure of the government’s financial situation is,
the larger are the practical evaluation and measure-
ment problems. So, there is a trade-off between theo-
retical relevance and practical applicability when
choosing a measure as a basis for policy.
Table 2.10 presents four different measures of the go-
vernment financial situation in 2001 for the EU coun-
tries. The first column shows government gross debt
according to the European Commission. The second
column shows the same measure according to the
OECD. Column 3 presents explicit government net
debt according to the OECD. Column 4 shows “total”
(explicit + implicit) net debt according to Frederiksen
(2002), where the implicit debt has been cal-
culated as the discounted value of future net expendi-
tures “associated with current expenditure and tax
policies”, thus taking into account inter alia pension
obligations and expected increases in health-related
expenditures. The numbers in parentheses rank the
countries according to the various measures. Table 2.11,
finally, shows the correlations between the different
measures.
Several observations may be made from the tables.
The Commission and OECD measures of gross debt
are highly correlated, but not identical. The average
government net debt ratio is 15–20 percentage points
lower than the gross ratios. There is a high correlation
between the net and gross debt measures. The largest
discrepancies refer to the Nordic countries (Denmark,
Finland and Sweden), all of which have substantially
lower net than gross debt.
“Total net government debt”, including also implicit
pension debt and the discounted present value of fu-
ture age-related expenditure increases, is five to six
times larger than explicit government net debt.
There is a positive but weak correlation between
explicit gross debt and “total net debt”, whereas
there is a weak negative correlation between explicit
net debt and “total net debt”. The weakness of the cor-
relations is explained by a few countries, whose relati-
ve positions change dramatically when “implicit debt”
is included. Italy, which has very low “implicit debt”,
then moves from being the most indebted country to
being a low-debt country, whereas Finland and
Ireland move from relatively low to relatively high
levels of government “debt”. As can be seen from
Table 2.11, the correlations increase substantially if
these countries are removed from the comparison.resents a fiscal policy to stimulate the economy
without incurring a larger budget deficit.The poli-
cy is often labelled an ”internal devaluation”, as it
reduces the real labour cost and depreciates the
real exchange rate in a similar way as a reduction
in the external value of the currency (Calmfors et
al., 1997; Calmfors, 1998). Such internal devalua-
tions were made in Denmark in the late 1980s and
in Sweden in the early 1990s.
The underlying assumption behind the proposal of a
German internal devaluation is that appropriate
reductions in the real labour cost
and relative wage levels vis-à-vis
other euro countries are at pre-
sent prevented – or take a very
long time to accomplish – because
of downward money wage rigidi-
ty: it is very difficult to reduce
money wage increases below
those of the other euro countries
at a low rate of inflation. The
expenditure switch in favour of
German products that a real
exchange rate depreciation would
achieve is motivated by a weaker
demand situation in Germany
than in the rest of the euro area
and would most likely have
occurred through an ordinary
exchange rate depreciation in the
absence of a common currency.
2.4. Depoliticising EU 
surveillance and excessive
deficit procedures 
The decision of the European
Council in early 2002 not to fol-
low the Commission’s recom-
mendation to give Portugal and Germany early
warnings for their failure to meet their budget tar-
gets, after heavy lobbying on the part of these coun-
tries, have seriously undermined the credibility of
the fiscal rules. Not least was the suspicion rein-
forced that it may be much more difficult to “shame”
a large country than a small one.It goes without say-
ing that the handling of the current deficits in
Portugal, Germany, France and Italy will be an “acid
test” of the credibility of the EU fiscal framework.
A fundamental problem is the political character of
EU decisions regarding the bud-
get situation in individual coun-
tries.The finance ministers in the
Ecofin Council have a strong
incentive to act strategically as
the budgetary surveillance
process and the excessive deficit
procedure have the character of
a repeated game: by adopting a
forgiving attitude towards col-
leagues with deficit problems,
the risk of being branded oneself




Different measures of government debt as percentages of GDP 
for the EU countries, 2001
Gross govern- Gross govern- Explicit net “Total net
ment debt ment debt government government
(EU Com- (OECD) debt debt”
mission)
Luxembourg 5.5 ( 1) 5.5 ( 1)
Ireland 36.6 ( 2) 36.5 ( 2) 32.0 ( 5) 302 (10)
United Kingdom 39.0 ( 3) 52.5 ( 5) 30.9 ( 4) 102 ( 1)
Finland 43.6 ( 4) 43.6 ( 3) – 47.9 ( 1) 335 (13)
Denmark 44.5 ( 5) 46.4 ( 4) 22.9 ( 3) 165 ( 2)
Netherlands 53.2 ( 6) 53.2 ( 7) 42.1 ( 7) 287 ( 8)
Portugal 55.6 ( 7) 55.6 ( 8) 53.0 (11) 222 ( 4)
Sweden 56.0 ( 8) 52.9 ( 6) 1.0 ( 2) 297 ( 9)
France 57.2 ( 9) 64.8 (11) 42.1 ( 7) 280 ( 7)
Spain 57.2 ( 9) 69.1 (12) 39.8 ( 6) 415 (14)
Germany 59.8 (11) 60.3 ( 9) 43.5 ( 9) 222 ( 4)
Austria 61.7 (12) 61.7 (10) 47.0 (10) 253 ( 6)
Greece 99.7 (13) 99.7 (13) 100.0 (14) 329 (12)
Belgium 107.5 (14) 108.2 (14) 98.9 (13) 311 (11)
Italy 109.4 (15) 108.7 (15) 96.5 (12) 174 ( 3)
GDP-weighted average 63.0 69.1 48.8 233
Unweighted average 59.1 61.2 43.0 264
Standard deviation 26.9 26.5 37.9 78
Coefficient of variation 0.5 0.4 0.9 0.3
Note: Gross government debt is total government debt, where only claims and liabil-
ities within the government sector have been netted out. Explicit net government debt
deducts government claims on the private sector from gross liabilities. “Total net
government debt” includes also “implicit” government debt associated with future net
revenue consequences of current expenditure and tax policies (thus reflecting also inter
alia future unfunded pension obligations and projected incresases in other age-related
government expenditures). The numbers in paranthesis give country rankings.
Source: Gross government debt: the EU Commission and the OECD. Explicit net
government debt: the OECD. “Total net government debt”: Frederiksen (2002).
Table 2.11
Correlations between the government debt measures in Table 2.10
Gross govern- Explicit net “Total net
ment debt government government
(OECD) debt debt”
Gross government debt 
(EU Commission) 0.98 0.80 0.10 (0.52)
Gross government debt
(OECD) 0.83 0.09 (0.52)
Explicit net government debt – 0.09 (0.32)
Note: The figures in paranthesis give the correlations when Finland, Ireland and
Italy have been excluded.
Source: Calculations by EEAG group and José Mauricio Prado.EEAG Report 67
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is reduced. If it is difficult to agree even on a rela-
tively harmless early warning, it may be almost
impossible to agree on harsher sanctions that involve
both a financial cost and a loss of national prestige.
Fines also risk triggering serious political conflicts
among the member states, which goes directly
against the aim that the EU should foster integration
and common understanding (Uhlig, 2002).
The root of the problem is that EU monitoring of
the fiscal situation in individual member states is in
the end done by the politicians responsible for
these very situations.This is an unsatisfactory state
of affairs. Our political systems usually draw a
sharp dividing line between making the laws
(which is done by elected politicians) and applying
them (which is done by an independent judiciary).
The budgetary surveillance process and the exces-
sive deficit procedure clearly violate this principle.
The Commission has proposed that it alone should
be given the power to issue early warnings in the
budgetary surveillance process. The drawback of
this proposal is that the Commission has weaker
political legitimacy than the Council. Still, we
endorse the proposal as a better alternative than
the present arrangement. But it is less clear that a
similar solution would be preferable for the exces-
sive deficit procedure. Buti et al. (2002) have pro-
posed that the Commission should be responsible
for determining the existence of an excessive
deficit and for giving a first warning to the member
state in question.The next step would then be that
the Council gives a second warning and requires
corrective action to be taken. In the final step, the
Council would take the decisions on sanctions, act-
ing on a proposal from the Commission, which
would have to be followed unless there is a unani-
mous decision not to do so.
An alternative way of depoliticising the excessive
deficit procedure would be to transfer the deci-
sions on sanctions from the political level of the
Council to the judicial level of the European Court
of Justice.The natural procedure would then be for
the Commission to take violations of the excessive
deficit criterion to the Court, which would then
make the ultimate decisions on deposits and fines,
possibly after hearing a standing panel of indepen-
dent economists. Specific procedures would then
have to be followed to ensure a speedy process,
which is necessary in order to create the proper
incentives for avoiding excessive deficit situations.
Our two proposals of making the deficit rules more
flexible and revising the decision process on exces-
sive deficits may appear unrelated.In fact,they are
not. The more credibly the fiscal rules are
enforced, the greater the scope for changes that
introduce more flexibility.
3. Is there a case for delegation of national fiscal
policy?
Section 2 focused on possible reforms of the EU
fiscal rules.There is, however, a risk that too much
of the fiscal policy discussion focuses on the EU.
The foundations of good fiscal policy must be laid
at the national level.If incentives for well-balanced
policies are too weak there, political conflicts
about the fiscal stance of individual member states
will arise continuously at the EU level, which will
undermine the legitimacy of the common rules.
The risk is all the greater,as there is some evidence
that peer pressure at the EU level exerts less influ-
ence on large than on small member states (von
Hagen et al., 2002).
The fiscal policy framework at the European level
relies mainly on the common rules with numerical
targets in the Maastricht Treaty and the SGP,
whereas it has been left to the member states to
decide on the national institutional frameworks to
ensure compliance. Another strategy would have
been to focus on common standards for the design
of national fiscal institutions and decision proce-
dures.The main reasons why the latter method was
not adopted is probably that it was considered to
imply much greater interference with national sov-
ereignty and to be associated with greater moni-
toring problems (Beetsma, 2001; Buti and Giudice,
2002). But the recent deficit experiences of some
EU states have vividly illustrated the difficulties
inherent in a system based mainly on the enforce-
ment of common numerical targets.This raises the
issue of whether one should not rely to a larger
extent on common standards for national fiscal
institutions.A parallel would be the common regu-
lation of the legal status of the national central
banks, which applies also to non-EMU members.
The argument is that it might pay to take the one-
off cost of reforming national institutions accord-
ing to commonly agreed principles, because this
would reduce the risks of inappropriate fiscal poli-
cies in individual member countries and hence the
risks of political conflicts at the EU level.Such common principles of national fiscal policy
frameworks could take the form of each member
state adopting a law on fiscal policy that must meet
certain minimum standards (see also Swedish
Government Commission on Stabilisation Policy in
the EMU, 2002; and Calmfors, 2002).The law should
specify long-run goals for the path of government
debt and/or the medium-term (cyclically adjusted)
fiscal balance. These goals must be consistent with
(but could be more ambitious than) the require-
ments of the Maastricht Treaty and the SGP. Such a
law should also define clearly the short-run stabilisa-
tion objectives of fiscal policy. It should be clarified
to what extent one intends to rely on the automatic
stabilisers and in what circumstances discretionary
policy action will be undertaken. Similar to the
Australian Charter of Budget Honesty, the govern-
ment could be obliged to indicate which tax and
expenditure changes are temporary (because they
are undertaken for stabilisation purposes) and “the
process for their reversal” (Business Council of
Australia, 1999).To shorten decision lags and reduce
the risk that income distribution aspects dominate
stabilisation considerations in concrete situations, a
law on fiscal policy could also select in advance a
small number of fiscal policy instruments to choose
from if the need for discretionary measures were to
arise (Swedish Government Commission on
Stabilisation Policy in the EMU, 2002; Calmfors,
2002).In addition,a law on fiscal policy ought to reg-
ulate the budget policies of sub-national local gov-
ernments such as to ensure compatibility with the
overall national fiscal objectives.
One should also try to ensure that the stabilisation
programmes submitted to the Ecofin Council by the
member states do not live a life of their own in the
national decision process, but are approved by the
parliament as part of the normal budget process, as
has been suggested by von Hagen et al. (2002). Such
an integration of the fiscal processes at the
European and national levels would seem necessary
to ensure consistency between national budget
objectives and commitments at the European level.
3.1 Lessons from the decision-making process for
monetary policy
Section 1 discussed why monetary policy is today
generally regarded as a much more effective stabil-
isation policy tool than fiscal policy. This is not
because fiscal policy is intrinsically less effective in
a technical sense, but because the decision-making
process involves much greater risks of bad timing
and expansionary bias. Whereas monetary policy
has been delegated to independent central banks,
which have been given clear stabilisation objec-
tives, fiscal policy is decided in drawn-out parlia-
mentary processes where stabilisation aspects
become intertwined with income distribution and
social efficiency aspects.This raises the question of
whether one can learn some lessons for the fiscal
policy decision-making process from the institu-
tional changes that have been adopted in the field
of monetary policy. Indeed, there exists recent lit-
erature which asks precisely this question.The con-
tributions include von Hagen and Harden (1994),
Eichengreen,von Hagen and Harden (1995),Saint-
Paul (1995), Calmfors (1995), Wren-Lewis (1996,
2000, 2002), Blinder (1997), Ball (1997), Business
Council of Australia (1999), the Economist (1999),
Eichengreen, Hausmann, and von Hagen (1999),
Seidman (2001), Wyplosz (2002), and the Swedish
Government Commission on Stabilisation Policy in
the EMU (2002).
The main theme in this literature is whether one
could improve both budget discipline and the effec-
tiveness of fiscal policy as a stabilisation tool through
delegation of some fiscal policy decisions to an inde-
pendent agency that is assigned clear policy objec-
tives by the political system, and whether this would
be compatible with accepted principles of democrat-
ic governance. The fiscal agency would then be
allowed to decide fiscal policy within predetermined
limits without political interference in a way similar
to how independent central banks pursue monetary
policy. Different authors have used different termi-
nologies for such a fiscal policy agency.We shall refer
to it as a fiscal policy committee (FPC for short) to
stress the parallel with monetary policy committees
in central banks.
The proposals vary as to the range of decision-
making powers given to the FPC. The most far-
reaching proposal is that of Blinder (1997) who
proposes that an FPC should be given the power to
decide the tax structure but not the level and com-
position of government expenditures, on the basis
of general objectives for income distribution and
social efficiency formulated by the legislature.
Blinder supports the delegation with the argument
that appropriate decisions on tax policy require a
long-term perspective, technical expertise, and that
undue influences from particularistic interest
groups are avoided.
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Other far-reaching proposals are those of von Hagen
and Harden (1994), Eichengreen, von Hagen and
Harden (1995), and Eichengreen, Hausmann and
von Hagen (1999).These contributions propose that
a FPC should decide a “debt change limit”,which the
government would be obliged to follow. Here, the
motivation is to enhance fiscal discipline by taking
the decisions on long-run debt accumulation out of
the political sphere which is assumed to suffer from
a deficit bias.
However, most of the proposals focus strictly on
the stabilisation aspect. This means that not only
decisions on the size and structure of government
expenditures, but also on the basic tax structure
and long-run debt accumulation (the fiscal balance
over the cycle or the cyclically adjusted annual fis-
cal balance) should remain in the political sphere.13
The FPC would only be delegated the power to
decide how the budget balance should vary around
the medium-term target depending on the cyclical
situation or to vary certain tax rates around prede-
termined base levels. The underlying idea is that
stabilisation of the business cycle is a commonly
shared objective, which requires more technical
expertise but fewer political trade-offs than other
fiscal policy decisions. Another motive is to sepa-
rate the stabilisation policy aspects of fiscal policy
from income distribution and resource allocation
aspects such that stabilisation decisions are not
“contaminated” by other considerations. The idea
is also to reduce the risk that fiscal policy changes
undertaken for stabilisation reasons involve a
deficit bias. Other motives are to shorten decision
lags and to make it easier to reverse fiscal policy
decisions.
3.2 Two models of delegation
The idea that part of fiscal policy could be delegat-
ed is no doubt unfamiliar and surprising to most
people. To quote the Economist (1999), most peo-
ple would probably regard “with horror” the idea
that tax rates would be adjusted “by a band of
unelected officials”. At the same time, there has
been a general trend in many areas of economic
policy making for politicians to focus more on set-
ting the overall objectives and then delegate the
operational decision-making to various bodies.The
idea is to remove the actual implementation of pol-
icy from day-to-day politics. Areas where this has
happened include, in addition to monetary policy,
competition policy (Majone, 1996) as well as regu-
lation and supervision of financial markets (see
Chapter 4).
Even though delegation of national fiscal policy
decisions to independent national bodies is not at
present on the political agenda, there is a case for
initiating a discussion of this possibility. It can be
viewed as a contrast to the recent proposals that
the European Commission should play a larger
role in evaluating and approving national fiscal
policies, which also represents a delegation to a
non-elected body. If one takes the subsidiarity
principle (see Chapter 3) seriously, one should
explore solutions at the national level as an alter-
native to an enhanced role for the European
Commission in the area of fiscal policy.
In the literature on fiscal policy delegation, two
basic models have been proposed. The first model
implies that the FPC decides the annual budget
balance, the second one that the FPC is allowed to
vary specific tax rates or government expenditures.
The FPC decides the annual budget balance
According to this model, which has been proposed
by Wyplosz (2002a,b),the parliament would decide
a budget target over the cycle or a target for the
cyclically adjusted budget balance. Given this con-
straint and some general guidelines on the roles of
automatic stabilisers and discretionary policy (for
example, specifying that discretionary fiscal policy
measures should only be undertaken when output
gaps are of a certain size, as proposed by the
Swedish Government Commission on Stabilisation
Policy in the EMU, 2002), the FPC would be given
the right to decide the annual budget target. The
parliament would commit itself to follow the rec-
ommendations of the FPC. The FPC would also
have to monitor both budget and cyclical develop-
ments over the fiscal year and have the power of
requesting amendments to the budget.
According to this model, the parliament retains the
right to decide through which tax and expenditure
changes the annual budget target should be met.This
means that the parliament controls the income dis-
tribution and social efficiency aspects of fiscal policy.
13 Note that targets for the “fiscal balance over the cycle” and “the
cyclically adjusted annual fiscal balance” are not identical require-
ments. A target for the fiscal balance over the cycle implies, for
example, that past misjudgements of the cyclically adjusted fiscal
balance should be compensated for in later phases of the cycle,
whereas this is not the case with the second formulation.As the FPC would determine only the variations
around the path of government debt over the cycle,
but not the path itself, its decisions would have a neg-
ligible effect on intergenerational equity.The flip side
of retained political decisions on all individual taxes
and expenditures is that the FPC does not acquire full
control over the stabilisation aspects of fiscal policy.To
the extent that different taxes and expenditures have
different multipliers,as discussed in Section 1.2,politi-
cal decisions on tax and expenditure changes consis-
tent with the budget target of the FPC can still affect
aggregate demand to a significant degree. This may
seriously complicate the task of the FPC,as it may not
be possible to offset such effects without violating the
long-run target for the fiscal balance.
The FPC varies individual tax rates or government
expenditures
According to the second model (see for example
Ball, 1997; Business Council of Australia, 1999; and
Seidman, 2001), the parliament would again take
the decision on the medium-term target for the fis-
cal balance. But in contrast to the first model, the
political sphere would only decide base rates for
some taxes and base levels for some government
expenditures (which would have to be consistent
with the medium-term target for the fiscal bal-
ance).The FPC would then be granted the right to
vary these tax rates and expenditure levels around
their base values within prespecified limits in order
to stabilise cyclical fluctuations.This could be done
in two different ways.
A first possibility is that the parliament determines
in advance which fiscal instruments should be var-
ied if the need arises.The simplest alternative is to
give the FPC control over only one specific fiscal
instrument. Alternatively, the parliament could
prescribe ex ante that discretionary fiscal policy
action should have a given composition (for exam-
ple, 30 percent of a fiscal stimulus should be a VAT
decrease,20 percent a reduction in employers’ pay-
roll taxes, 10 percent a reduction in personal
income taxes for low-income earners, and 40 per-
cent an increase in government consumption), as
proposed by Seidman (2001). This way the FPC
decides only the overall size of fiscal stabilisation
measures, but the political sphere retains control
also over the short-run income distribution effects.
A disadvantage of predetermining the composition
of fiscal stabilisation measures is that different pol-
icy responses may be called for depending on the
type of macroeconomic disturbance. For example,
an increase in government employment may not be
an appropriate response to a reduction in export
demand. So, deciding on the composition of stabil-
isation packages once and for all may unduly con-
strain policy choices in a given situation.
Predetermining the composition of discretionary
stabilisation measures would also require the par-
liament to form an informed view of which instru-
ments are “on average” the best.This choice would
be most important if one only delegates a single
fiscal instrument to the FPC. Which one should
then be chosen? There seems to be a presumption
in the delegation literature in favour of taxes (Ball,
1997; Blinder; 1997; Business Council of Australia,
1999). If so, one might argue that VAT changes
could be a good candidate, as they affect private
consumption in a similar way as interest rate
changes, which are already subject to delegation
(see Section 1.2). Delegation of the decision on
VAT changes would shorten decision lags. This is
likely to be particularly important for this instru-
ment, because long decision lags could actually
reverse the effect of policies: for example, a tem-
porary VAT increase to cool off a boom will have
an expansive demand effect in the period before it
enters into force (see Section 1.2). However, varia-
tions in government consumption, for example
through variations in general grants to regional
and municipal authorities,might very well also be a
suitable stabilisation policy parameter for an FPC.
As discussed in Section 1, recent research suggests
that expenditure multipliers may be larger than tax
multipliers. Delegation to an FPC could mitigate
the problem of irreversibility, which is usually
regarded an important argument against increases
in government expenditures in recessions
(Wijkander and Roeger, 2002; Swedish Govern-
ment Commission on Stabilisation Policy in the
EMU, 2002).14
Another possibility would be that the parliament
decides on a set of fiscal instruments that the FPC
can vary within certain limits, but leaves the com-
mittee complete freedom to choose which of these
instruments to be used in a specific situation. This
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would allow the FPC to use the instrument combi-
nation it finds most appropriate at each point of
time. It would also allow the FPC to adjust the use
of instruments to changes over time in the way
economists judge their effectiveness.15 With such
discretionary power over which instruments to use
in specific situations, the FPC acquires a larger –
but still limited – influence on income distribution
(and social efficiency), as there is no longer a
requirement that individual tax rates and govern-
ment expenditures be changed symmetrically over
the cycle.
There is one important difference between letting
the FPC vary the deficit target and letting it vary
specific tax rates or expenditures.According to the
former arrangement, the estimates of the FPC of
the cyclical situation of the economy are automati-
cally binding for the government. With the latter
arrangement, one might fear that overoptimistic
judgements of potential output on the part of the
government causes it to systematically overesti-
mate the cyclically adjusted balance, which might
contribute to a deficit bias. A possible way of
addressing this problem is to require that the esti-
mates of the cyclically adjusted balance be based
on the judgements of the FPC in the latter arrange-
ment, too.
3.3 Is there a democratic problem with delegation?
To ensure that fiscal stabilisation policy decisions
are taken at arm’s length from day-to-day politics,
it has been suggested that the fiscal policy commit-
tee should have a similar degree of independence
as a central bank. This would imply that the com-
mittee is not permitted to take instructions regard-
ing individual decisions from the government or
the parliament, and that the latter institutions are
not permitted to give such instructions. Appoint-
ments should be long-term and non-renewable.
Committee members should have professional
competence: either earlier practical experience of
economic policy making or analysis from ministries
of finance, central banks, international organisa-
tions (like the IMF, the World Bank or the
European Commission), private banks and so on,
or academic competence in the field of stabilisa-
tion policy and macroeconomic analysis. The FPC
should be granted a long-term budget, which could
not be changed from year to year.
The most common objection to delegation of fiscal
stabilisation decisions is that it would interfere
with conventional principles of democratic deci-
sion-making. How should one think about this? 
In any democratic society there exists the general
problem of how to allocate decisions between the
political and the technocratic spheres.This is done
in different ways in different societies and the allo-
cations also change over time. Different trade-offs
are made in different areas of policy-making.There
are no given standards, although there is a tenden-
cy to regard the current government institutions
“as if they were the natural order of things”
(Blinder, 1997) and not subject to the possibility of
reforms until the very moment when such reforms
take place.
The most important consideration for where to
draw the line between political and technocratic
decisions in a given area is the relative importance
of value judgements and technical expertise
(Majone, 1996).The reason why most proposals on
the delegation of fiscal policy exclude the size and
composition of government expenditures, the tax
structure and the size of long-run government debt
is that value judgements on income distribution
are crucial for these decisions. In contrast, macro-
economic stabilisation involves much less of value
judgements and is more a question of technically
finding the best ways of achieving commonly
shared objectives (see Section 3.1).Indeed,it is dif-
ficult to find any fundamental difference in this
respect between fiscal policy and monetary policy
to stabilise the business cycle.As noted by Blinder
(1997),most of the arguments against delegation of
fiscal stabilisation policy decisions could also be
used against the already existing delegation of
monetary policy.
To ensure the legitimacy of delegation of fiscal pol-
icy, an FPC would, of course, have to be subject to
democratic oversight and accountability. Even if
delegation is likely to improve fiscal policy “on
average”, democratic control would be needed to
reduce the risk that the FPC might at times pursue
idiosyncratic objectives or just make bad technical
judgements. Some lessons could be learnt from
monetary policy, but one could also go further in
some respects.
• Appointments of the members of the FPC
would be made by the government and be sub-
15 In view of the way “fashions” change over time among econo-
mists, this might not, however, be an unmixed blessing.ject to approval by the parliament. The candi-
dates should be subject to questioning in parlia-
ment before they are confirmed, as is the case,
for example, with members of the Federal
Reserve Board in the United States (in the
Senate). There is a similar procedure for the
members of the Executive Board of the ECB in
the European Parliament, although the parlia-
ment’s confirmation is not formally required.
• The objectives of the FPC should be determined
by the legislature. A high degree of transparen-
cy should be required of the committee. It
would have to explain all its decisions to the
general public and to publish background fiscal
reports (corresponding to the inflation reports
of, for example, the Bank of England and
Sveriges Riksbank) at regular intervals. The
minutes of the FPC meetings and voting records
should be published. The members of the FPC
should regularly take part in public hearings in
the parliament.
• The parliament should carry out ex post evalua-
tions of the committee’s performance with the
help of outside expertise. If the FPC fails over a
period of years to achieve its objectives by a
large margin – which needs to be given a clear
operational definition ex ante – the parliament
should have the possibility of dismissing the
whole committee or individual members of it.
Preferably,such dismissal should require a qual-
ified majority to protect the FPC against misuse
of this possibility.
• One could also conceive of an escape clause,
which would enable the parliament to override
an individual decision by the FPC. Again, this
could require a qualified majority.
• The ultimate check on a system of delegation is,
of course, the possibility to abolish the system
altogether if it does not work in the desired way.
In any discussion of democratic control,it is impor-
tant to distinguish between the formal aspects of
accountability and how the process works in prac-
tice. It has been argued that in practice there may
be more accountability with the delegation of a
specific “technical” task to an independent com-
mittee, with clearly defined objectives against
which to measure performance,than to have it exe-
cuted as one of many simultaneous tasks by the
government (Majone, 1996). The argument is that
the assignment of well-defined tasks to indepen-
dent bodies makes it easier to “nail down” mis-
takes than if a government is at the same time to be
held accountable for its performance in a large
number of fields through the ordinary political
process.
3.4 Weaker forms of fiscal policy committees
It is an open question whether one could find forms
for delegating the decisions on fiscal policy aiming at
macroeconomic stabilisation that would be accept-
able to the general public. However, there is good
reason to initiate a discussion. Most people are like-
ly to consider weaker forms of delegation politically
more realistic, at least in a short-term perspective.
One such possibility would be to give an FPC con-
trol only over a well-defined “rainy-day” stabilisa-
tion fund,but leave the political sphere in full com-
mand of the rest of fiscal policy (see also Section
2.3). Such a fund could be built up to a maximum
level through specific tax receipts in booms and
then run down through tax rebates in recessions.
Many might regard this alternative as “less contro-
versial” than the proposals in Section 3.2, because
the powers of the FPC would be more clearly
delineated and would not interfere with the normal
budget process. The idea has some resemblance
with the buffer funds in Finland that were
described in Section 1.2.These funds differ,howev-
er, from the institutions discussed here, because
they are of a corporatist nature:they are controlled
by the central labour market organisations and not
by an independent committee of experts.16 A gen-
eral drawback of the stabilisation fund solution, as
outlined here, is that it might introduce a “double
command” to the extent that the government uses
the fiscal parameters under its control to influence
the cyclical situation.
Another alternative has been suggested by Blinder
(1997). According to this, the ultimate decision on
a fiscal policy proposal of the FPC should be taken
by the legislature, but be subject to a simple up-or-
down vote. The proposal would thus have to be
either accepted without any changes or rejected.In
the latter case, one possibility could be to freeze
tax rates and nominal government expenditures at
last year’s level. Such an arrangement would give
the political sphere more influence than with dele-
gation of the actual decision-making, but the FPC
would still have a strong hand, as automatic “fiscal
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drag” would tend to strengthen the budget balance
in case the committee’s proposal is rejected by the
parliament.
Finally, one could give the FPC only advisory func-
tions, but with some teeth as proposed by the
Swedish Government Commission on Stabilisation
Policy in the EMU (2002).17 This alternative is our
preferred option for the near future.The FPC could
then be assigned the task of independently estimat-
ing the cyclical situation of the economy (the output
gap) and various tax and expenditure elasticities on
which the government must base its budget calcula-
tions.The FPC could also be required to make pub-
lic recommendations to the government on the
annual budget targets and on specific tax and expen-
diture changes. The government could be more or
less free to deviate from the recommendations of the
FPC. This might be allowed only under exceptional
circumstances. Alternatively, the government might
be free always to deviate from the recommenda-
tions,but would then be required to formally explain
the reasons in a specific parliamentary session.
Calmfors (2002) has proposed that the minister of
finance then should be obliged to take part in a
“reversed” public hearing, where he/she has to
explain to the FPC why its recommendations are not
being followed. The idea of these proposals is to
increase the governments’ reputational costs of devi-
ating from the judgements of the FPC.
The weakest form of an independent fiscal policy
committee is just to let it take part as another voice
in the public debate on the economy. This is more
or less the way in which the Sachverständigenrat in
Germany and the Economic Council in Denmark
work.In that case the influence of the independent
group of experts depends mainly on the reputation
it can build up over time through its judgements
and its ability to market itself. Its role can be
enhanced by requiring the government to respond
formally to the reports of the expert group
(Swedish Government Commission on Stabili-
sation Policy in the EMU, 2002).
Some contributions have proposed that monetary
policy committees (or executive boards) in existing
central banks could function also as fiscal policy
committees (Ball, 1997; Seidman, 2001; and Wren-
Lewis 2002). One motive is that there would be
small set-up costs if one uses an existing institution
which already has an independent status and has
acquired credibility for prudent stabilisation poli-
cies.Also,it might be regarded as less controversial
to build on an already accepted institution rather
than to establish a new one.Another argument has
been that such an arrangement would facilitate co-
ordination between fiscal and monetary policy.
However, this argument does not apply to EMU,
where monetary policy is centralised and fiscal pol-
icy decentralised. Here, it would rather be a ques-
tion of finding a new role for the boards of the
national central banks.18
National fiscal institutions that enhance the incen-
tives for fiscal discipline and effective stabilisation
policies reduce the risk of conflicts between
national stabilisation objectives and the common
EU fiscal rules. In a longer time perspective, the
common fiscal framework in the EU might allow
for and even encourage delegation of national fis-
cal stabilisation decisions along the lines we have
suggested. One can conceive of several ways of
doing this. For example, one could link our propos-
al of more flexible deficit ceilings in Section 2.2 to
the existence of independent national fiscal
authorities: low-debt countries could be allowed to
use their higher deficit ceilings only if this is
approved by the national FPC. Or if one adopts a
system of extra-budgetary “rainy-day” funds, these
might be used to avoid breaches of the three-per-
cent deficit limit only after a decision by an inde-
pendent national fiscal authority. Recommenda-
tions and early warnings in the case of deviations
from set budget targets could also take into
account how these relate to the decisions of an
independent fiscal authority.
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